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INTRODUCTION

Following the revolutions of 1989 and the disintegration of the
Soviet Union, the newly independent countries set out on a
programmatic path of reform and transition to democracy and a
market economy. The transitions in Central and Eastern Europe
(“CEE”), however, were unique in that they consisted of a “triple
transition”: the simultaneous marketization, democratization, and
state-building of a country.1 An essential, yet underemphasized
element of this cumbersome and complex transition process was
judicial reform.2 The normative residuum of the communist policy
See generally Nicholas Barr, From Transition to Accession, in LABOR MARKETS
SOCIAL POLICY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: THE ACCESSION AND BEYOND
(Nicholas Barr ed., 2005) (discussing social policy reform during and after
European Union (“EU”) accession and strategic reform policies directed at
accommodating constraints imposed by EU accession); LESZEK BALCEROWICZ,
SOCIALISM, CAPITALISM, TRANSFORMATION 146 (1995) (highlighting the emergence
of democratization before capitalization and the interplay of market-oriented
reforms under a democratic regime as distinguishing factors in the Central and
Eastern Europe transformations); Claus Offe, Capitalism by Democratic Design?
Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe, 58 SOC. RES. 865
(1991) (discussing the role of democratization in the transition from socialist to
capitalist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe). During communism, the
countries in Central and Eastern Europe were politicized by the communist
monopoly and were perceived as illegitimate by a significant portion of the
population. Thus, a major goal of the transition in Eastern Europe was relegitimizing or rebuilding the state. See ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, INTIMATIONS OF
POSTMODERNITY 156–74 (2001); Ken Jowitt, The Leninist Legacy, in EASTERN EUROPE
IN REVOLUTION 207 (Ivo Banac ed., 1992); Peter Evans, The Eclipse of the State?
Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization, 50 WORLD POL. 62 (1997); Anna
Gryzmala-Busse & Pauline Jones-Luong, Reconceptualising the State: Lessons from
Post-Communism, 30 POL. & SOC’Y 529 (2002).
2 This is not to say that constitutionalism has not been the focus of a rigorous
academic debate. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, CLAUS OFFE & ULRICH K. PREUSS,
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETIES: REBUILDING THE SHIP AT SEA
63–108 (1998) (discussing constitution making and the emergence of democratic
institutions, capital markets, and social policies in Eastern European countries);
László Bruszt & David Stark, Remaking the Political Field in Hungary: From the
Politics of Confrontation to the Politics of Competition, in EASTERN EUROPE IN
REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 13 (outlining the influence of electoral structure and
competition on transition periods in Eastern Europe); Kim Lane Scheppele, A
Comparative View of the Chief Justice’s Role: Guardians of the Constitution:
Constitutional Court Presidents and the Struggle for the Rule of Law in Post-Soviet
Europe, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1757 (2006) (discussing the role of constitutional courts
in former Soviet countries); Shannon Ishiyama Smithey & John Ishiyama, Judicious
Choices: Designing Courts in Post-Communist Politics, 33 COMMUNIST & POSTCOMMUNIST STUD. 163 (2000) (detailing the design and role of judicial institutions
and constitutional powers in post-communist politics); Gerald M. Easter,
Preference for Presidentialism: Postcommunist Regime Change in Russia and the NIS, 49
WORLD POL. 184 (1997) (discussing the institutional choice and comparative
1
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of marginalizing and politicizing the judiciary and its
corresponding institutions was a significant obstacle to the
establishment of a legitimate legal system capable of independent
judicial review.
Precisely how courts establish judicial independence during
the transitions in the CEE countries has remained largely
unexplored. The most notable empirical and theoretical studies on
judicial transition have focused on the formalistic aspects of legal
systems.3 According to these studies, the primary determinative
factor leading to an independent, legitimate judiciary in a postcommunist country has been the formulation of the legal system at
the constitutional level.4 The dispositive factor in such studies
usually is the presence or absence of a constitutional court,
insulated from the other components of the judicial system and
vested with the sole authority on questions of constitutional
interpretation.5
However, several empirical studies refute this position. Several
authors have demonstrated a statistical link between the de facto

presidentialism in former Soviet countries); Matthew S. Shugart, ExecutiveLegislative Relations in Post-Communist Europe, TRANSITION, Dec. 13, 1996, at 6; Jon
Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process, 45 DUKE L.J. 364
(1995) (providing an overview of the mechanics of constitution-making); Juan
Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism, 1 J. DEMOCRACY 51 (1990) (discussing the success
of parliamentary democracies over presidential democracies in guaranteeing
stability). The focus here, however, is a broader perspective on judicial transition.
This includes not only de jure constitutionalism, but also the operation of the
judicial system after the legal system had been constituted.
3 See, e.g., HERMAN SCHWARTZ, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN
POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE (2000) (providing an overview of the establishment and
behavior of constitutional courts in transitional regimes); Herman Schwartz,
Surprising Success: The New Eastern European Constitutional Courts, in THE SELFRESTRAINING STATE: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 195
(Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 1999) [hereinafter
Schwartz, Surprising Success] (detailing the success of Easter European
Constitutional Courts in establishing rule of law); Herman Schwartz, Eastern
Europe’s Constitutional Courts, 9 J. DEMOCRACY 100 (1998) [hereinafter Schwartz,
Eastern European Courts] (discussing the remarkable performance and stability of
Eastern European Courts); Albert P. Melone, The Struggle for Judicial Independence
and the Transition Toward Democracy in Bulgaria, 29 COMMUNIST & POST-COMMUNIST
STUD. 231 (1996) (arguing that separate budget for the judiciary, tenure for judges,
method for judicial selection is necessary for an independent judiciary).
4 See, e.g., Schwartz, Surprising Success, supra note 3; Schwartz, Eastern
European Courts, supra note 3.
5 See Schwartz, Surprising Success, supra note 3, at 210 (discussing the
importance of having a constitutional court with the power of judicial review over
legislative and executive acts).
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effectiveness of legal institutions and economic performance
measurements.6 When compared to measurements of how the
legal system is formally composed (de jure constitutionalism),
several studies have demonstrated that how well a legal system
actually functions has a stronger correlation with economic
growth, the enforcement of private property rights, and indicators
of the rule of law.7
However, a theory of judicial independence which incorporates
the modus operandi of the court system over time has yet to be
developed; the scholarly literature on the subjects lacks a
consensus on how legitimate, independent, judicial review is
established and even measured.8 Substantial questions remain as
6 See Katharina Pistor, Martin Raiser & Stanislaw Gelfer, Law and Finance in
Transition Economies, 8 ECON. TRANSITION 325, 328 (2000); Lars P. Feld & Stefan
Voigt, Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross-Country Evidence Using a
New Set of Indicators, 19 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 497, 516 (2003) (assessing how judicial
independence affects economic growth). This is not to say that that a correlation
between de jure constitutionalism has not been statistically linked to economic
growth. Several studies have measured the legal origin of various economic
factors (e.g., investor protection, the quality of legal enforcement, and the
concentration of corporate ownership). Various studies have argued that
countries with common law legal origins have the strongest creditor protection,
and German and Scandinavian legal models have the strongest law enforcement,
whereas the French civil-law model performed the worst in terms of legal
enforcement and investor protection. Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J.
POL. ECON. 1113, 1117–34 (1998) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Law and Finance];
Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1137–39
(1997) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Legal Determinants]. The implication of these
studies is that de jure constitutionalism retains some explanatory power regarding
its effect on economic performance.
7 For example, one study demonstrated the high level of de jure legal
protection in the Commonwealth of Independent States did not correlate with a
similar degree of legal effectiveness; suggesting that the law-on-the-books is not a
substitute for a de facto legal effectiveness. Pistor et al., supra note 6, at 356.
8 See Nancy Maveety & Anke Grosskopf, “Constrained” Constitutional Courts
as Conduits for Democratic Consolidation, 38 L. & SOC’Y REV. 463, 466–69 (2004)
(discussing the role and scope of the judiciary in a consolidating versus
established democracy). Studies have taken a multitude of approaches to
measuring judicial independence. Several studies have looked to the legal
tradition on which the constitution is based. See Feld & Voight, supra note 6, at
515; La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 6, at 1117–26, 1151–52; La Porta et
al., Legal Determinants, supra note 6, at 1138–39. Other studies have measured
legal effectiveness by: (1) a rule of law indicator; (2) effectiveness of bankruptcy
law; and (3) survey data on the effectiveness of the protection of property rights.
See Pistor et al., supra note 6, at 332–41. Paolo Mauro looked to the “efficiency and
integrity of the legal environment as it affects business.” Paolo Mauro, Corruption
and Growth, 110 Q. J. ECON. 681, 684 (1995). Feld and Voight looked to informal
social sanctions, judges’ term lengths and judges’ income. Feld & Voight, supra
note 6, at 516.
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to how court, over time, can create their own legitimacy and
independence from political and popular pressure on both
normative and practical levels. This Article aims to develop an
interpretive theory of judicial independence by examining the role
of international law in the jurisprudence of constitutional tribunals
with differing systems of judicial review in a comparative context.
This Article takes an interdisciplinary approach to unpacking
the development of judicial independence as a component of
economic, political, and social transition. Rather than employing a
strict jurisprudential study of the mechanisms of judicial
transitions, I incorporate studies from the economic and political
science disciplines which shed light on the confluence of judicial,
economic, and political transitions. These empirical studies also
provide statistical evidence in support of some of propositions
contained within this Article. Thus, Section 2 of this Article will
examine the role of judicial independence in both the economic
and political transitions unique to the nations of CEE. Indeed,
much of the literature on various elements of the economic
transitions of CEE focuses on the necessities of good corporate
governance, minimizing corruption, and a sound institutional
framework. Paramount to this study is investigating the normative
environment which existed under communism, in conjunction
with that which existed at the commencement of the CEE
transitions. To that end, this Article analyzes the communist
social, economic, political and judicial legacies from which I hope
to extrapolate those variables most central to establishing judicial
independence.
Building on the identification of those variables potentially
conducive to creating judicial independence, Section 3 outlines a
methodology for analyzing how judicial independence is
established in practice. This Section examines the systemic effects
on democratization and its consolidation as well as a method of
measuring judicial independence in practice. Section 3 looks to
instances of countermajoritiarian rulings—instances in which
courts of a transition country ruled against popular pressure
stemming from either the elected government or popular
support—as the starting point of how courts establish judicial
independence. Juridical patterns can then be identified and
examined in light of systemic indicators of judicial reform, such as
formal structure of the judiciary and the nexus between domestic
and international law.
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Section 4 examines two case studies:
the Lithuanian
Constitutional Court and the Estonian Supreme Court. Both of
these countries have similar normative experiences as constituent
components of the Soviet Union, yet adopted dissimilar judicial
structures and procedures. As such, a comparative study between
these two countries will be helpful in deducing conclusions by
looking for patterns and dissimilarities in their courts’ reasoning
while controlling for systemic variables of their legal systems.
Specifically, this Article argues that the development of an
independent judiciary in Estonia and Lithuania was done through
utilizing, what I have termed, “external source legitimacy.” By
interpreting domestic constitutional norms in light of nonbinding
international law, national courts can largely deflect political and
popular pressures while simultaneously asserting their own
legitimacy as a dispute arbiter. Some concluding remarks follow.
2.

JUDICIAL LEGACIES AND REFORMS

Any analysis of judicial reform must necessarily account for
two things: the starting point of the reform and the end result. A
discussion of the communist legacy and the challenges which the
CEE nations faced at the commencement of their transition
programs is useful in ascertaining what variables of reform are
appropriate for analysis. As will be evident in this Section, any
concept of meaningful judicial independence was lacking under
the Soviet system of government. Indeed, the concept of judicial
review was foreign to domestic courts. Yet it was vital—both
economically and politically—that the reform packages of the CEE
nations adopted at the outset of their transitions establish judicial
review and judicial independence. Thus, the following Sections
examine the Soviet judiciary, its normative underpinnings, and its
legacy in light of the greater reform packages implemented by the
former Warsaw Pact countries and newly independent states after
independence from the Soviet Union.
2.1. The Communist Judicial Legacy
The newly independent states of CEE had little experience with
judicial independence and review because of the legacy of
communism.
Although some countries had previously
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experimented with judicial review, such as Poland,9 most of the
countries to gain independence from the Soviet Union were devoid
of any normative and institutional foundations of an independent
judiciary. The transition to democracy, its consolidation, and the
creation of a market-based economy required these institutions to
be created, maintained, and adapted over time.
Judicial review can be loosely defined as “any judicial action
that involves the review of an inferior legal norm for conformity
with a higher one, with the implicit possibility that the reviewing
court may invalidate or suspend the inferior norm if necessary or
desirable.”10 It is a beautifully simple concept; the judiciary of a
nation adjudges the actions of its executive and legislative
branches. Yet this concept has evolved and been explored over
many generations and in many different societies.
Judicial review in the Soviet Union and in the Warsaw Pact
states was conspicuously absent. The communist system rejected
law (at least as originating from a judiciary) as a fundamental
component of statehood.11 This is evidenced, inter alia, by the
Soviet Supreme Court’s proclamation that “Communism means
not the victory of socialist law, but the victory of socialism over
any law.”12 Legislative bodies were recognized as the ultimate
expression of the will of the people and were accordingly beyond

9 See Mark F. Brzezinski & Leszek Garlicki, Judicial Review in Post-Communist
Poland: The Emergence of a Rechtsstaat?, 31 STAN. J. INT’L L. 13 (1995) (discussing the
establishment and evolution of judicial review in Poland). In 1985 Poland created
the Constitutional Tribunal (“Trybunał Konstytucyjny”) that was empowered to
adjudicate certain claims separate from the legislative function of government. Id.
at 21–24. Although vested with limited jurisdiction, the Tribunal protected
legislative acts from inconsistent regulations issued by administrative agencies
and established the normative seeds that would germinate into judicial review in
a post-communist Poland. Id. at 25–30. See also Mark F. Brezinksi, Note,
Constitutional Heritage and Renewal: The Case of Poland, 77 VA. L. REV. 49, 51–86
(1991) (reviewing the Polish constitutional history, illustrating Poland’s longlasting national attachment to constitutional principles); Andrzej Rapaczynski,
Constitutional Politics in Poland: A Report on the Constitutional Committee of the Polish
Parliament, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 595, 608 (1991) (examining constitutional questions of
the institutional structure of the Polish state).
10 Robert F. Utter & David C. Lundsgaard, Judicial Review in the New Nations
of Central and Eastern Europe: Some Thoughts from a Comparative Perspective, 54 OHIO
ST. L.J. 559, 561 (1993).
11 Yuri Feofanov, The Establishment of the Constitutional Court in Russia and the
Communist Party Case, 19 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 623, 628 (1993).
12 HAROLD J. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R.: AN INTERPRETATION OF SOVIET
LAW 26 (Rev. ed. 1963).
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The legislature was given
the reach of judicial restraint.13
responsibility for maintaining constitutionality, resulting in the
absence of judicial review of legislative enactments. The court
system did not adjudicate claims between individuals and the
government; citizens were to take their grievance to the bureau
with supervisory authority over the body responsible for the
harm.14
Indeed, the concept of separation of powers was foreign to the
classical communist system.15 The conceptualization of communist
“law” was synonymous with legislation and other acts of the
legislative body. The judiciary was at best a peripheral body with
limited
influence
within
the
communist
system.
Countermajoritarian rulings by a judicial tribunal were absent in
the communist system in both practice and at a normative level.
This system was maintained despite Gorbachev’s reforms
aimed at moving the system towards a “law-based state”
A Committee for Constitutional
(“pravovoe gosudarstvo”).16
Supervision was established and began experimenting with basic
judicial review, declaring edicts of the Soviet President
unconstitutional.
However, the fundamental belief that the
legislature was the supreme expression of the will of the people
persisted throughout the reform process. Consequentially, the
13 JOHN N. HAZARD, WILLIAM E. BUTLER & PETER B. MAGGS, THE SOVIET LEGAL
SYSTEM: THE LAW IN THE 1980’S 32 (1984). As Stalinist-era jurist criticized judicial
review by arguing that:

Every sort of statute [in bourgeois countries] is considered as having
force until it occurs to some private person or capitalist enterprise to file
a petition in court to have it . . . declared unconstitutional. Naturally this
right is broadly used by monopolist cliques of exploiters to obtain a
declaration of “unconstitutionality” as to laws running counter to their
interests.
ANDREI Y. VYSHINSKY, THE LAW OF THE SOVIET STATE 339–40 (1948). See also MARY
A. GLENDON, MICHAEL W. GORDON & CHRISTOPHER OSAKWE, COMPARATIVE LEGAL
TRADITIONS 726–27 (1985) (discussing the rejection of the doctrine of separation of
powers in socialist constitutional theory).
14 Rhett Ludwikowski, Judicial Review in the Socialist Legal System: Current
Developments, 37 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 89, 90–91 (1988).
15 GLENDON, ET AL., supra note 13, at 726–27. See also RENÉ DAVID & JOHN E.C.
BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 226-27 (3d ed. 1985)
(describing how Marixst-Leninist doctrine rejects the doctrine of the separation of
powers).
16 Feofanov, supra note 11, at 628. See also Ludwikowski, supra note 14, at 8990 (discussing the Marxist-Leninst jurisprudence’s rejection of the doctrine of
separation of powers).
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Commission lacked jurisdiction to review enactments by the
Supreme Soviet or the Congress of People’s Deputies.
Judicial independence of course presupposes the presence of
judicial review. The independence and objectivity of a judge as an
adjudicator of disputes is meaningless if he does not have the
power to review such disputes.17 Measurements of judicial
independence will be discussed in greater detail infra, but for
present purposes it can be broadly defined as “a judge’s freedom
to apply her interpretation of the law to each case before her.”18 In
practice, there was no judicial autonomy from the communist
Party apparatus, despite provisions in the 1936 and 1977 Soviet
Constitutions that “[j]udges and people’s assessors are
independent and subject only to the law.”19 To the contrary,
“telephone justice,” in which the Party apparatus approved judicial
opinions prior to their being rendered, was the standard practice.20
Judges were required to strictly adhere to standard interpretations
of law and adjudicate cases according to “revolutionary legal
consciousness.”21 International law was rarely referenced in
opinions as it was considered a bourgeois interference with the
creation and maintenance of the communist system.22
The primacy of the legislature as the supreme expression of the
people’s will led to the belief that an attempt by the judiciary to
See Christopher M. Larkins, Judicial Independence and Democratization: A
Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 605, 610 (1996) (discussing
the importance of a court’s legitimacy in answering legal questions).
18 Thomas E. Plank, The Essential Elements of Judicial Independence and the
Experience of Pre-Soviet Russia, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 6 (1996).
19 Konstitutsiia SSSR (1977) [Konst. SSSR] [USSR Constitution] art. 155. See
also Konstitutsiia SSSR (1936) [Konst. SSSR] [USSR Constitution] art. 112 (“Judges
are independent and subject only to the law.”). Similar provisions were found in
other communist constitutions. For example in Poland, the Constitution of 1952
mandated that “[j]udges shall be independent and subject only to the law.”
CONST. OF THE PEOPLE’S REP. OF POLAND, art. 178(2).
20 Scott P. Boylan, The Status of Judicial Reform in Russia, 13 AM. U. INT’L L.
REV. 1327, 1327–28 (1998). See also Schwartz, Eastern European Courts, supra note 3,
at 108.
21 Donald D. Barry, The Quest for Judicial Independence: Soviet Courts in a
Pravovoe Gosudarstvo, in TOWARD THE “RULE OF LAW” IN RUSSIA? 257, 258 (Donald
D. Barry ed., 1992). See also OLIMPIAD S. IOFFE & PETER B. MAGGS, THE SOVIET
ECONOMIC SYSTEM: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 8 (1987) (discussing the strict adherence to
the standard interpretation of constitutional principles).
22 See Pranas Kūris, Implementation of International Human Rights Standards in
the Lithuanian Legal System and the Problem of the Law-Based State, in TOWARDS THE
“RULE OF LAW” IN RUSSIA?, supra note 21, at 367, 368 (discussing the concept of a
law-based state and its relationship to international law and the domestic law).
17
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interfere with legislative proclamations was necessarily subversive.
Since the people could not act contrary to their own interests, there
was no need for judicial institutions to ensure that they did.23 That
is, the majoritarian nature of the legislature could not be overruled
by the judiciary in favor of a policy preference advocated by a
minority. This would mean that the judiciary had the same
standing as the legislative bodies of government. Since this was
doctrinally denied, the judiciary was relegated to a subordinate
role within the system. This invariably led to a general suspicion
and distrust of the judiciary as a “reactionary bourgeois
institution.”24
This general distrust of the judiciary was reflected in its day-today operations. The classical communist system subordinated the
judiciary to other branches of government. Fixed tenure and
compensation of judges are two key factors which help establish
and maintain judicial independence.25 However, the Party was
responsible for judicial appointments and the ministry of justice
administered the court budget.26 Furthermore, judges were looked
upon as legal experts with very limited authority, rather than
participants in the process of government—a symptom of the
overall lack of legitimacy of the judiciary.27 Thus, the legal system
as it existed under communism in the USSR lacked the normative
and institutional foundations associated with a modern judiciary.
The majoritarian nature of the legislature precluded outside
review, resulting in no independence of judges to objectively
adjudicate disputes or examine the constitutionality of legislative
enactments.

Robert F. Utter & David C. Lundsgaard, Comparative Aspects of Judicial
Review: Issues Facing the New European States, 77 JUDICATURE 240, 242 (1994). See
also HAZARD, ET AL., supra note 13, at 32 (“In a system where the legislature is
conceived to be the supreme expression of the will of all the people . . . how can
constitutional principles be enforced against a legislature’s will to change them
through ordinary legislation?”); VYSHINSKY, supra note 13, at 339–40 (contrasting
the Soviet system with that in the United States); GLENDON, GORDON, & OSAKWE,
supra note 13, at 726-27.
24 Utter & Lundsgaard, supra note 23, at 242.
25 Plank, supra note 18, at 8–9
26 See Boylan, supra note 20, at 1334.
27 See Utter & Lundsgaard, supra note 23, at 242 (discussing the reasons for
and nature of the lack of legitimacy of the judiciary in communist governments).
See also Christopher Osakwe, The Common Law of Constitutions of Communist Party
States, 3 REV. SOC. L. 155, 156, 163–73 (1977) (discussing features shared by
constitutions of the Communist party-states).
23
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2.2. Judicial Reform and Economic Transition
Stalin’s 1936 Constitution solidified the legal foundations of the
communist economic system.
Article 4 of the 1936 USSR
Constitution provided for the “liquidation of the capitalist system
of economy” and “the abolition of private ownership of the . . .
means of production.”28 As the various communist parties of
Eastern Europe solidified their control over their corresponding
governments, they placed the means of production under state
administration.29 Authorities completed nationalization processes
relatively quickly after the end of World War II.30 Soviet Union
Poland, for example, established organizations to administer
liberated Polish territories prior to the close of World War II.31
Authorities implemented the Nationalization Law by the
beginning of 1946 and mandated that all enterprises employing
fifty or more workers were to be under state control.32 The process
culminated with the state economic planning authorities
controlling 90 percent of all enterprises by the end of 1947.33
Czechoslovakia followed a similar pattern. The Soviets sought to
nationalize all enterprises administered by the Nazis and assumed
control over economic activity by the end of the 1940s.34
Konstitutsiia SSSR (1936) [Konst. SSSR] [USSR Constitution] art. 4.
IVAN T. BEREND, CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 1944-1993: DETOUR FROM THE
PERIPHERY TO THE PERIPHERY 73 (1996). The vast majority of industries were
nationalized by the various Soviet satellites by 1946. For example, the state
controlled approximately 89 percent of the Albanian economy by the end of 1946.
Id. Similarly the Yugoslav government administered approximately 82 percent of
the economy during the same period. Id. Likewise, 80 percent of the economies
of Poland and Czechoslovakia were directed and owned by the state. Id.
30 Id. at 73. By the end of 1948 the vast majority of Czechoslovak firms
employing more than fifty people were owned and administered by the State. Id.
In Poland, state-owned enterprises accounted for approximately 97 percept of
economic output. Id. By the end of the decade the overwhelming majority of both
the Romanian and Bulgarian economies were administered by the state. Id.
31 See 2 NORMAN DAVIES, GOD’S PLAYGROUND: A HISTORY OF POLAND 413
(1982) (demonstrating how two separate Communist organizations existed; one in
occupied Poland and one in the Soviet Union); JAN B. DE WEYDENTHAL, THE
COMMUNISTS OF POLAND: AN HISTORICAL OUTLINE 44–45 (1978) (explaining the shift
to active struggle by the Peasant Movement in the run up to World War II in
Poland).
32 DAVIES, supra note 31, at 426.
33 Id.
34 See JOSEF KALVODA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA’S ROLE IN SOVIET STRATEGY 180 (1978)
(explaining that Czechoslovakia’s move into the Soviet orbit included the
Communist takeover of economic enterprises that had been under German
control).
28
29
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Various bureaus of the Communist Party controlled all the
rights associated with private property—alienation, control, and
residual income. The right of alienation of property is the ability of
an owner to transfer, bequeath, or otherwise transfer property
without hindrance. In U.S. common law there has traditionally
been a presumption against restraining alienation.35 However in
the classical communist legal-economic system, the right of
alienation cannot be exercised by anyone, including the state.
State-owned firms were not tangible objects in the eyes of the state
and could not be bought or sold as such.36 Furthermore, the
classical communist system mandated that the residual income
from state-owned firms flow back into the coffers of the state
budget.37 That is to say there was no notion of profit in the sense
used in market economies.
Rather, the state bureaucracy
determined the contribution of each firm’s gross revenue paid to
the state as “centralized net income.”38 The state bureaucracy also
exercised control over the firm and its activities. The financial
affairs of the firm were organizationally separate from the matters
of bureaucratic control.39 This “ownership” paradigm had the
effect of depersonalizing property; there was no individual entity
that could be identified as the owner of property as there was a
complete separation from notions of control and ownership.40

35

The Supreme Court of Washington stated concisely that:

The great weight of authority is that where the fee simple title to real
estate passes under a deed or will, any restraint attempted to be imposed
by the instrument upon the grantee or devisee is to be treated as void,
and the grantee or devisee takes the property free of the void condition.
Richardson v. Danson, 270 P.2d 802, 807 (Wash. 1954); see also R.H. Macy & Co. v.
May Dep’t Stores Co., 653 A.2d 461 (Md. 1995) (holding a restraint on alienation of
a fee simple interest void and unenforceable); Horse Pond Fish & Game Club, Inc.
v. Cormier, 581 A.2d 478 (N.H. 1990) (requiring that a direct restraint on
alienation be reasonable in light of the parties’ interests); N.W. Real Estate Co. v.
Serio, 144 A. 245 (Md. 1929) (invalidating a grantor consent clause as an
unreasonable restraint on alienation of a fee simple conveyance); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS introductory note at 143 (1983) (“Much
of modern property law operates on the assumption that freedom to alienate
property interests which one may own is essential to the welfare of society.”).
36 JÁNOS KORNAI, THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
COMMUNISM 74 (1992).
37 Id. at 73.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 74–75.
40 Id. at 75.
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Of course some nations in Central and Eastern Europe deviated
from the classical socialist model of economics and property rights.
For instance, beginning in January 1968, Hungary implemented the
New Economic Mechanism, a series of economic reforms which
incorporated market information into the state planning
apparatus.41 Authorities incorporated “auxiliary enterprises” into
the Hungarian economy that functioned independent of direct
state control.42 They recognized various “intermediate property
forms” and created financial intermediaries to provide funding for
joint ventures.43
The creation of private property, the owner’s secure right
thereof, and the transfer of state-owned assets was a principle
component of the economic reform because it serves as the
foundation of a functioning market economy. An effective judicial
system is essential to the establishment and protection of private
property. The inadequate protection of property rights leads to
lower investment rates and slower economic growth.44 Moreover,
firms that operate in a legal environment that is effectively able to
guarantee property rights have comparably higher reinvestment

41 See ANDREW FELKAY, HUNGARY AND THE USSR 1956-1988: KADAR’S POLITICAL
LEADERSHIP 183, 189–90 (1989). By 1965 Hungary was trading extensively with
non-CMEA members and in 1982 became a member of the International Monetary
Fund and World Bank. Id. at 254–55.
42 Id. at 81. Auxiliary enterprises were not governed by the same rules as
industries but rather as part as collectives. Id. Examples of such enterprises are
food processing, furniture making quarries, and lumber. Id. “Family work
organizations”—family-oriented private enterprises—were also permitted to
operate outside of state control. Id. at 181-82. In the first year of the reform
approximately 11,000 new private companies were formed. The 1980 Party
Congress declared that:

During their spare time, a certain percentage of the workers participate
in work that is useful to the national economy and to the individual.
This is a supplementary source of our development that contributes to
satisfying ever-widening and changing demands and at the same time
enhances the growth of the nation’s wealth.
Id. at 252.
43 Id. at 184.
44 Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross
Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures, 7 ECON. & POL. 207, 210
(1995); Andrzej Rapaczynski, The Roles of the State and the Market in Establishing
Property Rights, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 87, 102 (1996) (“The absence of well-defined and
secure property rights . . . clearly contributes to a slower rate of transition.”).
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rates.45 Thus, the judicial protection of property rights is necessary
for economic growth.
Well-functioning judicial institutions are also necessary for the
creation and development of capital markets. Sound and effective
investor protection provided by courts raises the willingness of
consumers to purchase securities by decreasing the probability that
such investment will be expropriated in some way. Effective
judicial institutions therefore increase the demand for securities,
raise investment, increase the size of capital markets, and further
growth.46 Thus, judicial reform has significant implications for the
economic transition in Eastern Europe.
The creation of sound legal institutions, however, does not
occur spontaneously; there is no proverbial magic button that is
pushed as a constitution is drafted to guarantee private property
and investor protections. Rather, laws are written, often at the
commencement of economic and political transition, and
implemented over time. Technocrats learn, experiment, and repeat
based on experiences at both individual and collective levels.47
Moreover, law-based economic protections do not exist in a
vacuum—they also exist in a sociopolitical environment.
Pressures, both external and internal to government, influence how

45 Simon Johnson, John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Property Rights
and Finance, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1335, 1354 (2002) (finding that the reinvestment
rate for private firms operating in an environment with secure property rates is 56
percent compared to 32 percent for firms which operate in an insecure legal
environment).
46 See Feld & Voigt, supra note 6, at 516 (concluding that de facto judicial
independence positively influences real GDP growth on a per capita basis); La
Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note 6, at 1149 (finding a strong legal
environment, through legal rules and their enforcement, has the effect of
expanding capital markets); Ross Levine & Sara Zervos, Stock Markets, Banks, and
Economic Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 537, 537 (1998) (finding stock market liquidity
and banking development are positively correlated with economic growth);
Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Financial Dependence and Growth, 88 AM.
ECON. REV. 559, 559 (1998) (discussing the positive relationship between financialsector development and economic growth).
47 See, e.g., Mark Dodgson, Organizational Learning: A Review of Some
Literatures, 14 ORG. STUD. 375 (1993) (discussing the value in synthesizing different
approaches to create an interdisciplinary perspective to study organizational
learning); Daniel H. Kim, The Link Between Individual and Organizational Learning,
SLOAN MGMT. REV., Fall 1993, at 37 (presenting a framework to explain the process
through which individual learning advances institutional learning); C.
Mantzavinos, Douglass C. North & Syed Shariq, Learning, Institutions, and
Economic Performance, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 75 (2004) (exploring the link between
individual and collective learning and overall economic performance).
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law operates. Any understanding of judicial reform in Eastern
Europe must account for law as it evolves, and, more specifically,
how a legal tribunal can assert independent authority to adjudicate
claims in an environment where such a norm has been absent.
2.3. Judicial Reform and Democratic Consolidation
Similar to research on the economic transitions in Eastern
Europe, studies of democratization and democratic consolidation
have not adequately explored how judicial independence and
legitimacy are established over time by the courts. A multitude of
studies, however, have included judicial independence in their
discussion of general factors that lead to democratization and its
consolidation in Eastern Europe.
There is, however, no consensus on precisely what democratic
consolidation entails, when it is achieved, or what causes it to
occur. At a minimum, political scientists have viewed democratic
consolidation as a free democratic process (i.e. free elections).48
Others have seen it more comprehensively as a system of “interrelated arenas”: the presence of a civil society, political society,
economic society, state bureaucracy, and the rule of law.49 One
author described the essence of democratic consolidation as
leaving those political actors not engaged in democratic
rulemaking out of “the only game in town.”50
To complicate matters, there is significant disagreement as to
how this vague concept of democracy takes hold in a country after
a democratic transition. Some studies have looked to various
48 See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 250
(3rd ed. 1950) (“[T]he democratic method is that institutional arrangement for
arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the
people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble
in order to carry out its will.”).
49 See JUAN J. LINZ & ALFRED STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
AND CONSOLIDATION: SOUTHERN EUROPE, SOUTH AMERICA, AND POST-COMMUNIST
EUROPE 7–15 (1996) (identifying the five major arenas of a consolidated democracy
as civil society, political society, rule of law, state apparatus, and economic
Robert Dahl has also viewed democracy and the process of
society).
democratization in a broader sociological context. ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY
AND ITS CRITICS 233 (1989) (discussing the extent to which governments vary in
sustaining the democratic processes and institutions necessary for polyarchy). See
also ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY 1–33 (1971) (examining the significance of
polyarchy and the conditions that increase the chances of democratization);
ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 84–87 (1956) (discussing the
definitional characteristics, measurement, and preconditions for polyarchy).
50 GIUSEPPE DI PALMA, TO CRAFT DEMOCRACIES 113 (1990).
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preconditions, such as levels of economic development, as
important variables in explaining successful transitions to
democracy.51 Others have viewed democratization as something
that might be crafted or engineered by political actors. Proponents
of this perspective emphasize the role of power balances between
the opposition and the ancien régime,52 or among elites.53
Another body of literature discussing democratization and its
consolidation focuses on the role of institutions.54 Much of this
focus, however, has centered on executive-legislative relationships,
the relative strengths and weaknesses of presidential and
parliamentary systems, and how these systems have come into
being.55
There seems to be an emerging consensus that an independent
judiciary as a guardian of the rule of law is a vital component of
both the transition to and the consolidation of democracy.56 Many
studies have highlighted the crucial role of an independent

51 See Seymour Martin Lipset, The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited, 59
AM. SOC. REV. 1 (1994) (noting that economic development can help ensure
political stability).
52 See Michael McFaul, The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship:
Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World, 54 WORLD POL. 212 (2002)
(examining the different causal paths that account for post-communist regime
changes).
53 See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE
LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY 109–64 (1991) (examining democratic transitions during
the 1970s and 1980s and discussing the role of political elites in bringing about
these transitions); John Higley & Michael G. Burton, The Elite Variable in
Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns, 54 AM. SOC. REV. 17, 17 (1989) (discussing
the link between “consensually unified” elites and stable democratic regimes);
Dankwart A. Rustow, Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model, 2 COMP.
POL. 337 (1970) (arguing that the process of democratization begins through a
political struggle started by the emergence of a new elite rousing a leaderless
group into action).
54 See, e.g., JON ELSTER, CLAUS OFFE & ULRICH K. PREUSS, INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
IN POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETIES: REBUILDING THE SHIP AT SEA (1998).
55 See, e.g., Gerald. M. Easter, Preference for Presidentialism: Postcommunist
Regime Change in Russia and the NIS, 49 WORLD POL. 184 (1997); Donald L.
Horowitz, Presidents vs. Parliaments: Comparing Democratic Systems, 1 J. OF
DEMOCRACY 73 (1990); G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Contemporary Democracies:
Participation, Stability, and Violence, in PARLIAMENTARY VERSUS PRESIDENTIAL
GOVERNMENT 223 (Arend Lijphart ed., 1992); Alfred Stepan & Cindy Skach,
Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus
Presidentialism, 46 WORLD POL. 1 (1993).
56 LINZ & STEPAN, supra note 49, at 248. In the authors’ view of democratic
consolidation, the rule of law is part of one of five “interlocking arenas” of which
an independent judiciary is a principle component. Id.
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judiciary capable of reviewing executive and legislative decisions
as a prerequisite for the creation of a Rechtsstaat or “state of law.”57
A Rechtsstaat occurs when citizens are able to effectively assert
their political and civil rights against encroachments by the state,
thereby limiting the state’s executive and legislative discretionary
power.
Furthermore, an independent judiciary with the power to
review government decisions helps lead to a “constitutional
culture” whereby state and non-state actors learn that the legal
bounds of the system cannot be transgressed.58 This is particularly
important in the post-communist countries considering that the
judiciary was previously viewed with hostility and systematically
subordinated to the prerogatives of the legislative and executive
components of government. In short, a judiciary capable of
independent objective review is the “institutional mechanism to
safeguard the rule of law.”59
While much of the scholarly work emphasizes the importance
of judicial reform, it does not articulate how to achieve this reform.
The question remains whether the key to judicial reform lies in the
way judicial institutions are established or the way judicial
institutions operate. Moreover, how does international law affect
the way a domestic court can shape the new liberal social
dynamics of the state?
3.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF JUDICIAL REFORM

The principle aim of this Article is to examine the role of
international law in the judicial transition of CEE countries against
the formal structure of the judiciary. In order to successfully do so,
the case law of the sample countries must be analyzed against the
formal structure of the legal system. Lithuania and Estonia serve

57 See Mark F. Brzezinski & Leszek Garlicki, Judicial Review in Post-Communist
Poland: The Emergence of a Rechtsstaat?, 31 STAN. J. INT’L L. 13, 14 (1995) (discussing
Poland’s Rechtsstaat clause and the Polish Constitutional Tribunal’s use of it to
curb legislative and bureaucratic arbitrariness in the post-Communist era); Juan J.
Linz & Alfred Stepan, Toward Consolidated Democracies, 7 J. OF DEMOCRACY 14, 18
(1996) (discussing how modern forms of Rechtsstaat are fundamental in making
democratization possible).
58 See Christopher M. Larkins, Judicial Independence and Democratization: A
Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 605, 606 (1996) (explaining
that the institutionalization of the rule of law notifies political actors that the
bounds of the legal system cannot be transgressed for partisan political purposes).
59 Id. at 625.
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as ideal case studies for such a comparative study. First, both
countries were part of the Soviet Union, and thus shared similar
normative experiences under communism before facing similar
tasks of judicial reform when transition commenced. Lithuania
and Estonia gained independence from the Soviet Union at the
same time. Second, both applied for European Union (“EU”) and
Council of Europe (“CoE”) membership around the same time. It
is important to note that Lithuania and Estonia are located in
similar geopolitical positions in Europe, and thus the difference in
pressure from international organizations such as the EU and CoE
resulting from different geostrategic positions is likely to be
negligible. Third, both countries have a monist approach to
incorporating international law into their domestic legal regimes.
In short, the variability between the normative, geographic,
and historical factors of Lithuania and Estonia is comparatively
minimal. However, Lithuania and Estonia adopted dissimilar
systems of judicial review. Lithuania opted for the Austrian
“centralized” judicial system, including its corresponding
institutions, standing requirements, and model of judicial review.
Estonia conversely chose a more “diffuse” model of judicial review
grounded in the American tradition of jurisprudence. Thus, these
two countries provide for an optimal case comparison as we can
control for systemic factors between the two countries and then
look to patterns in their judicial reasoning to reach conclusions
about how the formal structure of the judiciary affects a court’s
reasoning.
For reasons previously discussed, judicial independence in a
transition country can be observed when a court rules against an
issue
with
popular
or
governmental
support,
i.e.
countermajoritarian issues.60 Thus, an analysis of such cases can
reveal the actual way in which independence was asserted. When
the legal reasoning in opinions from two different legal systems—
one in the Austrian model and the other in the American—are
compared, the significance of the judicial review system can be
ascertained. The case law of Estonia and Lithuania will be
examined for patterns of legal reasoning. The following outlines
the theoretical foundations of judicial review, as well as the postindependent political context in which they take place.

60

See supra Section 2.1.
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A stark pattern emerges from an analysis of the case law from
Estonia and Lithuania. Both countries, notwithstanding the
systemic differences in the composition of their respective
judiciaries, look to international law as a component of their legal
reasoning. Thus, in establishing their independence vis-à-vis
political pressures from the other institutions of government and
wider populations, the national courts utilized international law as
an external source of legitimacy. This “external source legitimacy”
permitted the national court system to establish itself as a
legitimate institution with respect to the popularly elected
institutions of government.
This is paramount as there was no pre-existing normative
frame by which judicial institutions were popularly perceived as a
naturally legitimate component of government. Indeed, policy
outcomes are seen as legitimate “to the extent they receive
reflective assent through participation in authentic deliberation by
all those subject to the decision in question.”61 Therefore, in
essence, a legitimacy gap transpired at the outset of transition,
which made the CEE judiciaries highly susceptible to political
pressure. By relying on external source legitimacy, the postindependence Constitutional and Supreme Courts were able to fill
that legitimacy gap and establish themselves as independent legal
arbiters.
3.1. Models of Judicial Review
Judicial institutions created during the process of constitution
drafting could be modeled in the tradition of one of the two
alternative legal systems: the American or Austrian models.62
None of the CEE countries, except Estonia, opted for the American
system of judicial review.63 The American model places the
Supreme Court as the highest appellate court. The system is
“diffuse” in that lower courts have the jurisdiction to declare acts
of government unconstitutional.64 Courts can only “concretely”
61 John S. Dryzek, Legitimacy and Economy in Deliberative Democracy, 29 POL.
THEORY 651, 651 (2001).
62 Erhard Blankenburg, Changes in Political Regimes and Continuity of the Rule
of Law in Germany, in COURTS, LAW, AND POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 249,
308 (Herbert Jacob et al. eds., 1996).
63 Schwartz, Eastern European Courts, supra note 3, at 100–101.
64 Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, & Olga Shvetsova, The Role of Constitutional
Courts in the Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government, 35
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 117, 121 (2001).
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review a dispute that contains an actual case or controversy at
issue.65 Additionally, only ex post review is exercised, meaning
that an act must have been passed before a court can consider its
constitutionality.66 Lastly, parties must comply with the complex
set of standing requirements in order to question the
constitutionality of an act.67
In contrast, the Hans Kelsen-inspired Austrian system of
judicial review vests the responsibility of constitutional review of
legislative acts and executive degrees in a constitutional court.68
The constitutional court is a specialized tribunal, distinct from the
rest of the judiciary, and the only judicial body with jurisdiction to
assess the constitutionality of government acts.69 In this sense, the
system is “centralized” because the regular judiciary does not
possess the ability to determine the constitutionality of legislative
enactments. Usually, a lower court is required to refer a
constitutional question to the constitutional court prior to
concluding a proceeding.
The Austrian system also vests constitutional courts with the
authority to engage in ex ante review, allowing them to examine
the constitutionality of a government’s policy prior to its
effectuation. Moreover, a constitutional court may usually engage
in “abstract” judicial review.70 This type of judicial review occurs
when certain political actors or citizens have the right to challenge
the constitutionality of legislation in the absence of an actual
controversy.71 Thus, the right to examine the constitutionality of
legislative enactments exists as a general governing principle.72
Finally, standing requirements in the Austrian system are less
rigorous and grant a multitude of actors—from politicians to
Id.
Id.
67 Id.
68 See Herman Schwartz, The New Eastern European Constitutional Courts, 13
MICH. J. INT’L L. 741, 744 (1992) (“As opposed to the American ‘diffuse system,’
Europeans concentrate the power to review the constitutionality of legislation in
one special tribunal which is not part of the ordinary judiciary and does not
adjudicate conventional litigation . . . .”).
69 See Torbjörn Vallinder, When the Courts Go Marching In, in THE GLOBAL
EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER 13 (C. Neal Tate & Torbjörn Vallinder eds., 1995).
70 Georg Vanberg, Abstract Judicial Review, Legislative Bargaining, and Policy
Compromise, 10 J. THEORETICAL POL. 299, 301 (1998).
71 Id. at 300.
72 Leonas Sabaliūnas, Comparative Perspectives on Judicial Review in Lithuania,
48 EUR.-ASIA STUD. 783, 787 (1996).
65
66
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ordinary citizens73—the ability to challenge the constitutionality of
a law before the tribunal. This is in sharp contrast to the American
model of jurisprudence, which does not allow members of
Congress to initiate a challenge to the constitutionality of a law.
Under the Austrian model, relaxed standing requirements allow,
and even encourage, such challenges.
3.2. Systemic Effects on Democratization and Consolidation
Much of the scholarship on the role of the judiciary in
democratization centers on the institutional design of the legal
system. The vast majority of legal systems in CEE have adopted
the Austrian-Kelsen model of judicial review as well as its central

73 Germany, Hungary, and Russia grant private individuals access to their
respective constitutional courts. In Germany, for instance, any person may file a
constitutional complaint (“Verfassungsbeschwerde”) alleging that a violation of a
constitutional right occurred. See Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland
[GG] [Constitution] art. 93(1) (4a) (F.R.G.) (stating that “[t]he Federal
Constitutional Court shall rule . . . on constitutional complaints, which may be
filed by any person alleging that one of his basic rights. . . has been infringed by
public authority.”); Gesetz über das Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfgGG] [Law on
the Federal Constitutional Court], Dec. 12, 1951, BGBl. I at 243, amended by Act of
16 July 1998, BGBl. I at 1823, art. 13(8a) (providing that “The Federal
Constitutional Court shall decide in the cases determined by the Basic Law, to wit
8a. on constitutional complaints”). Article 90 of the BVerfGG also provides that:

(1) Any person who claims that one of his basic rights or one of his rights
under Articles 20 (4), 33, 38, 101, 103 and 104 of the Basic Law has been
violated by public authority may lodge a constitutional complaint with
the Federal Constitutional Court.
(2) If legal action against the violation is admissible, the constitutional
complaint may not be lodged until all remedies have been exhausted.
However, the Federal Constitutional Court may decide immediately on a
constitutional complaint lodged before all remedies have been exhausted
if it is of general relevance or if recourse to other courts first would entail
a serious and unavoidable disadvantage for the complainant.
(3) The right to lodge a constitutional complaint with the constitutional
court of the Land in accordance with the provisions of the Land
constitution shall remain unaffected.
Id. art 90(1)–(3). See also A MAGYAR KÖZTÁRSASÁG ALKOTMÁNYA [Constitution] art.
32b (Hung.) (outlining the jurisdiction of the The Parliamentary Ombudsman for
Civil Rights and the Parliamentary Ombudsman for the Rights of National and
Ethnic Minorities); Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [KONST. RF.] [Constitution]
art. 125(4) (1993) (Russ.) (“The Constitution Court of the Russian Federation, upon
complaints about violations of constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens and
upon court requests shall check, according to the rules fixed by the federal law,
the constitutional of a law applied or subject to be applied in a concrete case.”).
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institution: the constitutional court. This can be attributed, in part,
to the pervasive suspicion of judges during the communist
period.74 The awesome power to declare legislative acts invalid
was not entrusted to normal judges.75 The preponderance of
constitutional courts in the countries that emerged from
communism was also due to unfamiliarity with American-style
jurisprudence. Professor Jon Elster argues that constitutional
courts in the Austrian tradition are a vital component of
democratization and democratic consolidation, especially in
fragmented societies where a neutral arbiter of disputes fosters
ideas of constitutional supremacy and judicial depolitization.76
Others have asserted that the importance of constitutional courts in
post-communist transition lies in the nature of the political
transition.77 The principal risk to individual liberties is from
administrative agencies and “pliant” legislatures, which can
violate rights while maintaining the semblance of democratic
legitimacy. It is argued that a constitutional court, as a neutral
legal arbiter formally insulated from political pressure, is a better
protector of individual liberties and the fairness of the political
process than the regular judiciary.
Therefore, the Austrian model was viewed as the best available
vehicle for institutionalizing judicial independence. The absence of
judicial independence under communist rule required going
beyond formal guarantees of autonomy regarding the regular
judiciary—recall that Article 112 of the 1936 USSR Constitution
mandated judicial independence.78 A constitutional tribunal, on
the other hand, insulated the court from pressures from other
government actors.
This view was supported by Helmut
Steinberger’s Council of Europe study in which he stated:
74 See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text (discussing that communistera judges were required to adhere to standard legal interpretations and
discouraged from citing international law precedent).
75 See HERMAN SCHWARTZ, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN POSTCOMMUNIST EUROPE 22 (2000) (explaining that, because of the entrenched distrust
of ordinary judges as policy makers, ex-Communist countries only authorized
special tribunals to annul legislation).
76 ELSTER ET AL., supra note 54.
77 See generally, Schwartz, Eastern European Courts, supra note 3, at 110
(providing specific examples of the role of constitutional courts in Eastern Europe
in the 1990s).
78 See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing how there was no
judicial autonomy in practice despite provisions for judicial independence in the
Soviet Constitution).
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Especially if a state wishes to introduce constitutional
jurisdiction to its legal system, for the first time, possibly in
connection with a new constitution, it appears preferable to
entrust the decision of constitutional issues to a special
institution, raised (to that extent) above the ordinary courts.
For in this situation the judges of the ordinary courts may
be neither trained nor used to dealing with constitutional
matters.79
Additionally, some argue that the relaxed standing
requirement of the Austrian system encourages multiple actors to
file challenges regarding an act’s constitutionality, including
members of the legislative assemblies.80 This, in turn, has an
“anticipatory effect” of giving the parliamentary majority the
incentive to consider minority interests during the legislative
process.81 Logically, a radical policy would inevitably bring a
constitutional challenge from the opposition. The Austrian system
thus encourages policy compromise and legislative bargaining,
which might otherwise be absent.
Alternatively, some scholars posit that judicial institutions
further democratic consolidation by “channeling” legislative
programs along paths of internationally defined reforms because
the courts can translate international norms into concrete
constitutional arguments.82 Moreover, the model argues that
judicial legitimacy can be created because the courts can effectively
link the legitimacy of international law and domestic law through
legal reasoning. In other words, judicial independence lies in the
de facto operation of the court system rather than its formal
structure. Courts can best fulfill this role when three conditions
are present: (1) the presence of international constraints, (2)

HELMUT STEINBERGER, MODELS OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION 3 (1993).
See Schwartz, Eastern European Courts, supra note 3, at 102 (noting that all
European constitutions encourage constitutional challenges by legislators).
81 See Georg Vanberg, Abstract Judicial Review, Legislative Bargaining, and Policy
Compromise, 10 J. THEORETICAL POL. 299, 300 (1998) (observing that a system of
abstract review encourages majority groups to weigh opposition interests when
drafting legislation).
82 See Maveety & Grosskopf, supra note 8, at 464 (asserting courts can
facilitate democratic consolidation through constitutional adjudication that
channels legislative initiatives down particular paths and reconstitutes the context
in which democratic decision making takes place).
79
80
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conflicts between majority and minority interests, (3) and the
explicit incorporation of international law into domestic law.83
3.3. Measuring Judicial Independence
As discussed, judicial review is necessary for an independent
judiciary to exist.84 Once the judiciary obtains the jurisdiction to
review acts of government, the analysis shifts to measure how such
review is exercised. That is, how independent is the judiciary in
practice once it has received the power to adjudicate disputes? The
literature examining judicial independence, in both economic and
political contexts, primarily concentrates on the formal, or de jure,
requirements of judicial impartiality. It considers factors including
fixed tenure and compensation for judges, the presence of
minimum qualifications for judicial officials, and the extent of
Other studies have looked to judicial
judicial immunity.85
independence by examining the finality of judicial decisions, the
type of judicial review, judges’ term lengths, the requirements for
removal, and formal court procedures.86 There is a similar pattern
of such measurements in the economic literature discussed above.87
However, certain studies have concluded that “court behavior
often responds to factors unrelated to its constitutionally defined
authority.”88 These studies have further found that the formal
provisions guaranteeing an independent judiciary were “not
related significantly” to the way judicial review was exercised in
practice.89 Thus, measuring judicial independence by considering
only the formal guarantees of judicial autonomy without

83 See id. at 467–68 (suggesting three contextual attributes of the democratic
consolidation process that allow a court to channel legislative initiatives).
84 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
85 See generally Thomas E. Plank, The Essential Elements of Judicial Independence
and the Experience of Pre-Soviet Russia, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (1996) (arguing
that these institutional arrangements are necessary for the existence of judicial
independence).
86 See generally Shannon Ishiyama Smithey & John Ishiyama, Judicious Choices:
Designing Courts in Post-Communist Politics, 33 COMMUNIST & POST-COMMUNIST
STUD. 163 (2000) (identifying six components that measure judicial power).
87 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
88 Erik S. Herron & Kirk A. Randazzo, The Relationship Between Independence
and Judicial Review in Post-Communist Courts, 65 J. POL. 422, 435 (2003).
89 Id. at 432.
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considering judicial interpretation is insufficient for a complete
analysis.90
Communist doctrine placed the legislative bodies at the center
of government structure, as the expression of the voice of the
proletariat.91 The majoritarian nature of legislative acts trumped
the power of the judiciary, thereby denying judicial review and
independence.92 Given that the judiciary was formally granted
jurisdiction to review decisions in the post-communist era, the
logical place to examine the exercise of such jurisdiction is
instances in which courts have ruled against governments with
widespread popular support. Thus, judicial independence can be
effectively examined in the post-communist context in cases where
the courts have been expressly countermajoritarian.93
This notion, as reflected by studies on judicial independence, is
generally defined as follows:
(a) the degree to which judges believe they can decide and
do decide consistent with their own personal attitudes,
values, and conceptions of judicial role (in their
interpretation of the law), (b) in opposition to what others,
who have or are believed to have political or judicial power,
think about or desire in like matters, and (c) particularly
when a decision adverse to the beliefs or desires of those

90 See generally Keith S. Rosenn, The Protection of Judicial Independence in Latin
America, 19 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987) (“[F]ormal constitutional
guarantees of judicial independence have been largely ineffective in much of Latin
America because of certain structural features of Latin American politics and legal
institutions.”).
91 See supra notes 11–15 and accompanying text.
92 See supra notes 16–22 and accompanying text.
93 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962) (explaining that judicial review is a
countermajoritarian force). Other scholars have identified the same notion with
different language. Robert Dahl referred to the “majority criterion” as a court’s
decision to protect “minorities against tyranny by majorities.” Robert A. Dahl,
Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J.
PUB. L. 279, 281−82 (1957). See also Sarah Wright Sheive, Central and Eastern
European Constitutional Courts and the Antimajoritarian Objection to Judicial Review,
26 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1201, 1216 (1995) (arguing that European constitutional
courts’ “abstract review of parliamentary legislation” is a powerful example of
“antimajoritarian objection”).
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with political or judicial power may bring some retribution
on the judges personally or on the power of the court.94
Several
studies
have
generally
followed
the
countermajoritarian approach to measuring judicial independence.
Professor Owen Fiss, for instance, looked to the “political
insularity” of the judiciary—that is the extent to which the
judiciary is independent from the influence of political actors and
public opinion.95 Other studies have similarly argued that in
addition to formal guarantees, measures of judicial independence
should also include the extent to which the judiciary is perceived
as legitimate, and its functional operation.96 Indeed, several
studies that analyze how constitutional courts foster the protection
of individual liberties assume that the judiciary is insulated from
the other branches of government.97 This implies that a court is
independent to the extent that it rules against other branches of
government—in other words, countermajoritarian decisions.
3.4. International and European Law
3.4.1.

The Relationship between International and Domestic Law

Marxist ideology viewed international law as bourgeois and
accordingly restricted its influence in domestic jurisprudence.98

94 THEODORE L. BECKER, COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL POLITICS: THE POLITICAL
FUNCTIONINGS OF COURTS 144 (1970).
95 Owen M. Fiss, The Limits of Judicial Independence, 25 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REV. 57, 59−60 (1993). Epstein et al., examines judicial independence as a function
of the “tolerance interval[]” of other branches of government to the policy and
political ramifications of judicial decisions. Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Olga
Shvetsova, The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Establishment and Maintenance of
Democratic Systems of Government, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 117, 131 (2001).
96 See Christopher M. Larkins, Judicial Independence and Democratization: A
Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 605, 610 (1996) (arguing that
“the extent to which [courts] are collectively seen as a legitimate body for the
determination of right, wrong, legal, and illegal” should be incorporated in the
definition of judicial independence) (emphasis omitted); Sheive, supra note 93, at
1225 (arguing that democracy may be diminished in the public’s mind when
constitutional courts have broad power to review parliamentary legislation).
97 See Schwartz, Eastern European Courts, supra note 3, at 111 (“Without an
institution free from the timidity and stifling judicial deference to legislative
supremacy that are still common among the general run of the judiciary in most
East European countries, too many dubious laws and official actions would
remain unchallenged.”).
98 Kūris, supra note 22, at 368.
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Moreover, none of the Warsaw Pact members regulated the
relationship between international law and domestic law through
constitutional provisions, leading to variant constructions of the
force of international law among the communist countries.99
Independence and the framing of new constitutional orders
provided the opportunity for the countries under the former
sphere of Soviet influence to re-evaluate and clarify the
relationship between domestic and international law.
There are two general approaches of transposing international
law into domestic jurisprudence. Under a “dualist” approach,
international treaties are considered by courts as distinct from
domestic law, typically requiring an act of transformation by
parliament to render such agreements enforceable in the domestic
courts.100 Alternatively, states can opt for a “monist” system
whereby international treaties are automatically considered part of
domestic law.101 This allows domestic courts to apply the
principles and norms of international law without an additional act
from the government.102
Some commentators have posited that, jurisprudentially, the
independence of a state, in and of itself, subjects that state to the
bounds of international law.103 Indeed, this “independent nation
thesis” even found support in early U.S. Supreme Court opinions
and writings supporting the ratification of the United States
Constitution. An early American case regarding the repayment of

99 See Eric Stein, International Law in Internal Law: Toward Internationalization of
Central-Eastern European Constitutions?, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 427, 432 (1994) (noting
the dearth of constitutional provisions or legislation to regulate the effect of
international law).
100 John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy
Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 310, 314–15 (1992).
101 Konstantin Korkelia, New Trends Regarding the Relationship Between
International and National Law (With a Special View Towards the States of Eastern
Europe), 23 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 227, 228 (1997).
102 Id.
103 See Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L.
REV. 1555, 1556 (1984) (“An entity that becomes a State in the international system
is ipso facto subject to international law.”). See also Philip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 AM J. INT’L L. 740, 743
(1939) (stating that the duty to apply international law in federal courts is one
imposed upon “the United States as an international person”); Lord Blackstone
also alluded to the status of customary international law as enforceable in
domestic courts. International law was viewed as “a system of rules, deducible by
natural reason, and established by universal consent among the civilized
inhabitants of the world. . . .” 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *66.
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pre-Revolutionary War debts owed to British subjects led the
Supreme Court to proclaim that “[w]hen the United States
declared their independence, they were bound to receive the law of
nations, in its modern state of purity and refinement. By every
nation, whatever is its form of government, the confiscation of
debts has long been considered disreputable . . . .”104
The new constitutions of CEE countries demonstrate a “clear
tendency towards ‘de jure recognition’ of the primacy of
international law . . . .”105 There are important implications of this
trend for democratization and democratic consolidation. First, the
monist approach of incorporating international treaties into
domestic law places primacy on international human rights norms.
Judicial protection of individual liberties grounded in international
law is more resolute when such international treaties are deemed
to take precedence over domestic legislation. Second, a monist
system gives courts the authority to reference international
principles and norms, and allows courts to link their own
legitimacy with that of the international treaty.106 As such, the
method of incorporating international treaties into domestic laws is
paramount. Generally, the constitutions of Central and Eastern
Europe explicitly provide that international law is directly
applicable by domestic courts, thereby allowing courts to serve as
conduits of democratic consolidation.
3.4.2.

The European Union and Council of Europe

The collapse of the USSR, the emergence of a unipolar world
order, and the presence of the European Union all distinguish the
Central and Eastern European economic and political transitions.
A principle objective of the post-communist states was a successful
accession to the European Union. A successful application for
membership required meeting the Copenhagen Criteria, part of
104 Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796) (Wilson, J., writing seriatim)
(emphasis omitted). See also James T. Gathii, The American Origins of Liberal and
Illiberal Regimes of International Economic Governance in the Marshall Court, 54 BUFF.
L. REV. 765, 776–79 (2006) (discussing the background of Ware v. Hylton). For a
learned commentary on the examination by American courts of international legal
sources see David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA
L. REV. 539 (2001).
105 Vladlen S. Vereshchetin, New Constitutions and the Old Problem of the
Relationship Between International Law and National Law, 7 EUR. J. INT’L L. 29, 29
(1996).
106 Maveety & Grosskopf, supra note 8, at 467.
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which provides that membership is contingent upon the “stability
of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human
rights and respect for and protection of minorities . . . .”107
Furthermore, successful accession depends upon a candidate
country adopting the Acquis Communautaire of the European
Union—the entire 80,000 pages of statutes, regulations, and
opinions promulgated by the EU.108 The progress of candidate
countries was (and is) monitored by the EU, which delivered
yearly regular reports regarding various aspects of the transition.
Indeed, the conditionality of EU membership creates its own
dynamics both internal and external to the state.
Such
conditionality works through a commitment-device mechanism
arising out of the power asymmetry between the EU and candidate
countries.109 The governments of candidate countries are less likely
to postpone difficult compliance policies for short-term political
gains.110 EU conditionality enables national politicians to resist
pressure from domestic interest groups as well as gain interim
credibility benefits such as lower investment risk premiums and
higher foreign investment rates.111
Presidency Conclusions, European Council, 13 (June 22, 1993), available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/PressData/en/ec
/72921.pdf.
108 Heather
Grabbe, European Union Conditionality and the Acquis
Communautaire, 23 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 249, 256 (2002) (outlining the process of
accession for candidate countries).
109 See James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse & Claire Gordon, Conditionality and
Compliance in the EU’s Eastward Enlargement: Regional Policy and the Reform of Subnational Government, 42 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 523, 523 (2004) (identifying the
premise that EU conditionality exists because of power asymmetry). Indeed, the
dynamics of conditionality are outside the reach of this Article. However, it
suffices to say that candidate countries have tremendous financial power with
transition assistance and potential access for post-accession structural funds. See
Council Regulation 622/98, art. 4, 1998 O.J. (L 85) 1, 2 (EC) (“[W]hen the
commitments contained in the European Agreements are not respected and/or
progress towards fulfilment [sic] of the Copenhagen criteria is insufficient, the
Council . . . may take appropriate steps with regard to any pre-accession
assistance granted to an applicant State.”). See also Alain Guggenbühl &
Margareta Theelen, The Financial Assistance of the European Union to Its Eastern and
Southern Neighbours: A Comparative Analysis, in THE EU’S ENLARGEMENT AND
MEDITERRANEAN STRATEGIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 217 (Marc Maresceau &
Erwan Lannon eds., 2001) (analyzing the EU’s financial transfers).
110 Richard Bronk, Commitment and Credibility: EU Conditionality and Interim
Gains (European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science,
Working Paper No. 2002–02, 2002), available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/3863.
111 See Richard E. Baldwin, Joseph F. Francois & Richard Portes, The Costs and
Benefits of Eastern Enlargement: The Impact on the EU and Central Europe, 12 ECON.
107
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The EU’s regular reports assess a candidate country’s progress
toward meeting all of the requirements for membership.112
Specifically, the regular reports and opinions serve a
“gatekeeping” function because they are used to determine when
further negotiations can commence, and thus provide a constraint
on domestic policy.113 This is especially the case since democracy
was linked with access to further membership negotiations at the
Helsinki European Council in 1999.114 Notably, the EU was not the
only institution to have influence over transition policies in CEE.
Membership in the CoE requires ratification of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms and the European Convention of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”). The European Court of Justice
often relies on ECHR jurisprudence in making the Council of
Europe “a de facto condition” for a successful accession.115

POL’Y 127, 139–42 (1997) (examining the effect of EU membership on decreasing
investment risk in Central and Eastern European countries).
112 Grabbe, supra note 108, at 262.
113 See Gwendolyn Sasse, The European Neighbourhood Policy: Conditionality
Revisited for the EU’s Eastern Neighbours, 60 EUR.-ASIA STUD. 295, 295 (2008)
(likening the EU’s regular reports to the ENP Progress Reports because, just as
regular reports monitor candidate countries’ progress in order to assess whether a
candidate country can move further in the process of gaining membership to the
EU, ENP Progress Reports help to determine whether the EU can create a
stronger, or more intimate, relationship with a particular country); James Hughes
& Gwendolyn Sasse, Monitoring the Monitors: EU Enlargement Conditionality and
Minority Protection in the CEECs, 1 J. ETHNOPOL. & MINORITY ISSUES IN EUR. 1, 2
(2003) (analyzing the structure and content of the regular reports on candidate
countries to determine whether there is a positive correlation between the reports
and policy-making in the field of minority rights in these countries).
114 See Grabbe, supra note 108, at 256. (“The Helsinki European Council . . .
made an explicit linkage between access to negotiations and the democracy
condition for the first time . . . .”).
115 See generally Gwendolyn Sasse, EU Conditionality and Minority Rights:
Translating the Copenhagen Criterion into Policy (European University Institute,
Working Paper No. 16, 2005). Indeed the accession criteria of the EU and CoE are
similar in many respects. See EUR. PARL. ASS., Resolution 1115 on Setting Up of An
Assembly Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member
States of the Council of Europe, 1997 Sess., DOC. 7722 (1997); EUR. PARL. ASS., Order
485 on the General Policy of the Council of Europe, 44th sess., Doc. 7277 (1993); EUR.
PARL. ASS., Order 488 on the Honouring of Commitments Entered Into by New Member
States, 39th Sess., Doc. No. 6682 (1993); EUR. PARL. ASS., Resolution 917 on a Special
Guest Status with the Parliamentary Assembly, 39th Sess., Doc. 6036 (1989); EUR.
PARL. ASS., Resolution 7037 on the Honouring of Commitments Entered Into by Member
States When Joining the Council of Europe, 45th Sess., Doc. 7037(1994).
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CASE STUDIES

Lithuania and Estonia offer a unique opportunity for a
comparative case study because both countries had the same
experiences with the communist judicial system for the same
period of time.116 The Baltic countries generally adopted liberal
post-WWI constitutional frameworks committed to the democratic
ideals that inspired the creation of the League of Nations. The
Soviet Union “liberated” Estonia and Lithuania from German
occupation in 1944 and 1945, respectively. After Lithuania and
Estonia became Soviet republics, Moscow required that the codes
and laws of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
(“RSFSR”) be applied, and subsequently replace all national
Judicial harmonization between the Estonian and
laws.117
Lithuanian republics and the USSR was complete by the early
1950s and they remained synchronized until independence.118
Zhdanovschina—the Soviet policy of asserting complete control
through terror—was implemented throughout the Baltic States.119
The constitutional arrangements of both countries were
determined by their respective constitutions as well as the
constitution of the USSR. Thus Lithuania and Estonia have the
same normative legacies as the USSR. Moreover, both countries
had similar pre-Soviet experiences with independence.
An
independent Lithuania adopted a purposefully democratic
constitution in the interwar years, which generally guaranteed
individual rights and provided for the protection of minorities.120
See supra Section 3.
See Deitrich A. Loeber, Regional and National Variations: The Baltic Factor, in
TOWARD THE “RULE OF LAW” IN RUSSIA? POLITICAL AND LEGAL REFORM IN THE
TRANSITION PERIOD 77, 79 (Donald D. Barry ed., 1992) (noting that when Estonia
and Lithuania were occupied by the USSR, RSFSR law resumed effect in the
nations).
118 See MARKKU SUKSI, ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF ESTONIA 16-17
(1999) (discussing effect of Soviet occupation on Estonia’s legislative and judicial
branches); V. STANLEY VARDYS & JUDITH B. SEDAITIS, LITHUANIA: THE REBEL NATION
60 (1997) (asserting that politically, Lithuania was “forcibly socialized into Soviet
norms and behaviour” and that culturally, Lithuania had to accept Russian
personnel as well as the use of the Russian language in the country).
119 See ANATOL LIEVEN, THE BALTIC REVOLUTION: ESTONIA, LATVIA, LITHUANIA
AND THE PATH TO INDEPENDENCE 92 (1993) (discussing Zhdanovschina in the Baltic
states).
120 See SUKSI, supra note 118, at 9–10. All three Baltic States developed liberal
constitutional frameworks in the interwar period. Lithuania adopted a “highly
democratic” constitution which generally guaranteed individual rights and
provided for the protection of minorities. LIEVEN, supra note 119, at 64; THOMAS
116
117
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In the interwar years Estonia became a member of the League of
Nations, and, like Lithuania, provided for minority protections,
separation of powers, and elaborate guarantees of civil liberties in
its 1920 Constitution. The Estonian Constitution was considered
advanced among the contemporary constitutions of that era.121
4.1. Lithuania
4.1.1.

Institutional and Contextual Factors

Independence brought the annulment of the Lithuanian SSR
and Soviet Constitutions and a reorientation towards a lawgoverned Lithuania.122 Consequentially, motivated by a desire to
break away from Lithuania’s communist past and the lingering
distrust of the judiciary’s ability to overrule the legislature, the
framers of the new Lithuanian Constitution aimed to establish
judicial review in accordance with the classic Austrian system of
justice.123 Article 102 of the Lithuanian Constitution establishes the
jurisdiction of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court (“Konstitucinis
Teismas”) by providing that the “The Constitutional Court shall
decide whether the laws and other legal acts adopted by the
Lithuanian Parliament (“Seimas”) are in conformity with the
Constitution and legal acts adopted by the President and the
Government, do not violate the Constitution or laws.”124
Furthermore, Article 104 of the Constitution mandates that the
Lithuanian Constitutional Court operate separately from all other
State institutions.125
Moreover, Article 110 of the Lithuanian Constitution creates a
“centralized” model of judicial review by denying trial and
regional courts the authority to review the constitutionality of
In contrast to the
legislative and executive enactments.126

LANE, LITHUANIA: STEPPING WESTWARD 19 (2001). An independent Estonia can be
traced to the Nystad Treaty of 1721. Loeber, supra note 117, at 78.
121 SUKSI, supra note 118, at 9–10.
122 LANE, supra note 120, at 132.
123 Sabaliūns, supra note 72, at 786.
124 LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS KONSTITUCIJA [Constitution] art. 102 (1992) (Lith.)
(emphasis added).
125 Id. art. 104.
126 Sabaliūnas, supra note 72, at 785 (“Apparently, distrust of the courts
associated with the communist past, doubts about the concentration of judicial
powers, a belief in the effectiveness of special-purpose tribunals, and favourable
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American model, lower courts are required to suspend the
proceeding and refer constitutional questions to the Constitutional
Court for review. After the Constitutional Court determines the
constitutionality of the law in question, the case is then able to
proceed in the lower court.
Authority to petition the Lithuanian Constitutional Court
regarding the constitutionality of an act of government resides in a
number of actors. First, one-fifth of the Seimas members or a
reference from a lower court may challenge an act of the
government or the President.127 Furthermore, the President, the
government, the courts, as well as the one-fifth of the Seimas may
also challenge the constitutionality of an act passed by the Seimas.
In the period from 1993 to 2009, the overwhelming majority of the
432 constitutional challenges were brought by the one-fifth of the
Seimas and by the courts.128 There is also a formal requirement that
the reasons a case should be heard by the Constitutional Court be
stated in the arguments; in practice, however, it has proven
sufficient to merely assert that a given act is unconstitutional.129
The framers of the Lithuanian Constitution believed that
international law should apply in domestic courts so that domestic
law would be harmonious with international norms, especially in
the area of human rights.130 However, the Lithuanian Constitution
makes provisions for the incorporation of international treaties into
domestic law, but without specifying supremacy or precedence of
such international treaties.131 Article 138 states that ratified
international treaties “shall be of the constituent part of the legal
system of the Republic of Lithuania.”132 The Constitutional Court
has also affirmed this “monist” approach to the incorporation of

impressions of the constitutional courts in Western Europe have combined to
predispose the framers to this particular institution.”).
127 LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS KONSTITUCIJA [Constitution] art. 106 (1992) (Lith.).
128 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, Statistics on Petitions
and Inquiries Received at the Constitutional Court, http://www.lrkt.lt/Statistics1
_e_s.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2009).
129 Sabaliūnas, supra note 72, at 788.
130 Kūris, supra note 22, at 370.
131 Vereshchetin, supra note 105, at 35.
132 LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS KONSTITUCIJA [Constitution] art. 138 (1992) (Lith.).
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international law into Lithuanian domestic legal framework
without any enabling requirements.133
4.1.2.

Case Law

4.1.2.1.

The Death Penalty

The death penalty has a long history in Lithuania; the first legal
provisions regulating its application go back to the sixteenth
century. Although the practice was abolished briefly by the 1920
Constitution, the Soviets re-imposed it for a multitude of crimes
deemed to be counter-revolutionary.134 Although the Soviet and
Lithuanian SSR Constitutions were annulled at independence, the
Seimas adopted the Soviet Criminal Code which included the death
penalty.135 A series of amendments were adopted, yet the death
penalty was preserved because a large proportion of the public
opinion (between 70 and 80 percent) favored the practice.136 This
led to the Seimas’ failure to ratify Protocol 6 of the ECHR requiring
the abolition of the death penalty.
As permitted by the Constitution, a minority of members of the
Seimas brought a challenge in the Constitutional Court that the
death penalty was incompatible with the Lithuanian Constitution.
Specifically, the challenges were based on Articles 18, 19, and 21(3),
guaranteeing the natural rights of individuals, granting citizens the
right to life, and prohibiting torture or treatment that degrades
The Constitutional Court
human dignity, respectively.137
considered the challenge to the death penalty in the case of
December 9, 1998.
The Court’s reasoning was grounded in international human
rights norms: it utilized a significant amount of international law,
not only in direct application, but also in its non-binding dicta and

133 The monist approach to the interaction between international and
domestic law was confirmed by the Constitutional Court. On International
Treaties of the Republic of Lithuania, Advisory Op., Const. Ct. Lith., Oct. 7, 1995.
134 Vaidotas Vaicaitis, Note, The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania
and the Death Penalty: A Note on the Judgment of 9 December 1988 [sic], 26 REV. CENT.
& E. EUR. L. 85, 96–97 (2000).
135 Id. at 86–87.
136 On the Death Penalty Provided for by the Sanction of Article 105 of the
Criminal Code (Death Penalty Case), Const. Ct. Lith., Dec. 9, 1998, translated at
http://www.lrkt.lt/dokumentai/1998/n8a1209a.htm.
137 Id. § I, paras. 1–5.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss1/4

2009]

TOWARD AN INTERPRETIVE MODEL

237

legal reasoning. Many of the experts’ opinions were grounded in
the recognition that most European states and governmental
organization favor abolishing the death penalty. The Court
acknowledged CoE Recommendation 1246 stating that the “death
penalty has no legitimate place in the penal systems.”138 The Court
noted the CoE’s Resolution 1044 declaration that ratification of
Protocol 6 of the ECHR should be a prerequisite to EU
membership.139 The decision further acknowledged that the
abolition of the death penalty was a de facto requirement for EU
membership, and that the general trend in Europe was the
abolition of the death penalty (which essentially all European
countries had done).
The essence of the concrete legal reasoning beyond that of the
non-binding dicta was rooted in a dual reading of Articles 135 and
138 of the Lithuanian Constitution. Article 135 states that the
“principles and norms of international law” are to be pursued by
Lithuania.140 Article 138 states that international agreements are
automatically incorporated by the Lithuanian legal system.141
These two provisions read together, according to the Court,
required it be noted that:
[T]he State of Lithuania, recognising the principles and
norms of international norms, may not apply virtually
different standards to the people of this country.
Holding that it is a member of the international
community possessing equal rights, the State of
Lithuania, of its own free will, adopts and recognises these
principles and norms, the customs of the international

138 EUR. PARL. ASS., Recommendation 1246 on the Abolition of Capital Punishment,
Res. No. 1246 (1994). See also EUR. PARL. ASS., Report 7154 on the Abolition of Capital
Punishment, Rep. No. 7154 (1994); Death Penalty Case, § III, para. 10–12 (opining
that the death penalty is rarely necessary and society can be protected in other
ways).
139 Death Penalty Case, § III, para. 12. See also EUR. PARL. ASS., Resolution 1044
on the Abolition of Capital Punishment, Res. No. 1044 (1994) (“The adequate
implementation of the additional protocol to the European Convention on Human
Rights should be a matter of continuous concern to the Assembly and the
willingness to ratify the protocol be made a prerequisite for membership of the
Council of Europe.”).
140 LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS KONSTITUCIJA [Constitution] art. 135 (1992) (Lith.).
141 Id. art. 138.
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community, and naturally integrates itself into the world
culture and becomes its natural part.142
Yet there was no international law to which Lithuania was a
party that mandated the abolition of the death penalty. The 1966
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights sanctions the application of
the death penalty for the most egregious crimes.143 The 1953
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms also allows the death penalty to be applied
for crimes mandated by law.144 What is interesting about the
Court’s opinion is that it considers the abolition of the death
penalty as part of a process rather than something which has been
established.145
Lastly, the decision cited European Court of Human Rights
(“ECtHR”) jurisprudence for guidance on the administration of the
death penalty.146 Specifically, the decision noted the definition of
punishment in Ireland v. United Kingdom,147 which concerned police
abuse and torture of suspects relating to the conflict in Northern
Ireland. The Constitutional Court defined what types of treatment
and punishment are prohibited.148

Death Penalty Case, § VI, para. 20.
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6(2), Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“In countries which have not abolished the death penalty,
sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance
with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary
to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be
carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court.”).
144 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 2(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (“Everyone’s
right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction
of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.”).
145 Vaicaitis, supra note 134, at 87–89.
146 Death Penalty Case, § VI, para. 74.
147 Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. 41 (ser. A) (1978).
148 Death Penalty Case, § VI, para. 74. The Constitutional Court noted that the
European Court of Human Rights prohibited:
142
143

torture-deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel
suffering; inhuman treatment or punishment-infliction of severe mental
or physical suffering; degrading treatment or punishment-treatment
such as to arouse in the victim a feeling of fear, anguish and inferiority
capable of humiliating and debasing him and possibly breaking his
physical or moral resistance.
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The ECtHR decision did not consider retributive justice
including the death penalty. Ireland v. United Kingdom involved
only the treatment of pre-trial detainees. Yet the Court was able to
link human degradation as a result of torture to the death penalty.
The Constitutional Court observed that the Lithuanian
Constitution “links the prohibition to torture, injure, degrade,
maltreat a person, as well as that to establish such punishments,
with the activities of the state and its respective institutions.” 149
The Court then proceeded to hold that:
Assessing the death penalty through the prism of the
treatment which is prohibited by the Constitution, its
specific aspect is revealed. Degradation of the dignity of the
convict derives essentially from the cruelty of the death
penalty itself. The cruelty manifests itself by the fact that
after the death sentence has been carried out, the human
essence of the criminal is negated as well, he is deprived of
any human dignity, as the state in that case treats the
person as a mere object to be eliminated from the human
community.150
The Court ruled that the death penalty was incompatible with
the Lithuanian constitution and, thus, was annulled.151
The main arguments of the Court in striking down the death
penalty were rooted in “external validity.”152 The Court looked to
international law in its reasoning but did so in a way that went
beyond the Constitution’s “monist” provision of directly applying
international law in domestic courts.153 The Constitutional Court
was under no direct obligation to strike down the death penalty

Id. The Constitutional Court read the European Court of Human Rights’ holding
with Article 21 of the Lithuanian Constitution which provides in part that: “The
dignity of the human being shall be protected by law. It shall be prohibited to
torture, injure a human being, degrade his dignity, subject him to cruel treatment
as well as establish such punishments.” LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS KONSTITUCIJA
[Constitution] art. 21(2)–(3) (1992) (Lith.).
149 Death Penalty Case, § VI, para. 75.
150 Id. § VI, para. 78.
151 Id. § VI, para. 83.
152 Vaicaitis, supra note 134, at 104.
153 See LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS KONSTITUCIJA [Constitution] art. 138 (1992)
(Lith.) (providing in part that “International agreements which are ratified by the
Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania shall be the constituent part of the legal system
of the Republic of Lithuania.”).
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because of the inapplicability of Protocol 6 of the ECHR. Rather,
the Court looked to CoE and EU non-binding resolutions and the
practice of other European nations as external source legitimacy.
The Court also framed the opinion in the context of being part of a
greater European community in which the death penalty was
becoming passé. The Court highlighted the 1998 EU Regular
Report’s identification of the death penalty as an unresolved
problem regarding accession.154 Thus, the Court established its
independence and legitimacy by way of international political
constraints through the formal and informal utilization of
international law.
4.1.2.2.

Criminal Procedure

The pervasive suspicion regarding laws and judges in the
former Soviet Union extended to legal practitioners as well.
Defense attorneys (“advokat”) had to negotiate a precarious
position as agents of the state and agents against the state. The
legal status of attorneys was formalized and regulated in the early
Stalinist years when 8,000 advocates were authorized to serve a
population of 191 million.155 All attorneys were subservient to the
Communist Party and required to disseminate propaganda
through public lectures, and approximately 60 percent of attorneys
were members of the Communist Party.156 However, the role of
defense attorneys was also by its nature anti-State: the defense of
clients accused of committing an offence against the state could be
seen as an affront to the state itself.
Soviet criminal procedure was an Orwellian amalgamation of
an inquisitorial approach and authoritarianism. The desire for
high conviction rates led to high discretion regarding what
evidence was admitted into the trial and whom to charge with a
crime. Much of the pre-trial procedure involved the investigation
by an agent of the Office of the Procurator-General, usually a KGB
member.157 A subject of much debate in the former Soviet Union
154 See European Commission, Regular Report from the Commission on Lithuania’s
Progress towards Accession, at 9, COM(1998) 706 final (noting Lithuania’s failure to
abolish the death penalty).
155 Pamela Jordan, The Russian Advokatura (Bar) and the State in the 1990s, 50
EUR.-ASIA STUD. 765, 766 (1998) (citing Polozhenie ob Advokature SSSR’ [VVS
RSFSR] [Decree on the Bar of the USSR] 1939, 49, item 394).
156 Id. at 766–767.
157 See Donald D. Barry & Harold J. Berman, The Soviet Legal Profession, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1, 28 (1968) (noting that the procuracy, the civilian police and the
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was the role of a defense attorney in the pre-trial process. Because
of the quest for high conviction rates (incidentally around 99
percent), and the nature of the inquisitorial system, counsel was
denied during criminal investigations and interrogations.158
Although formal guarantees of attorney-client privilege existed,
only around 35 percent of attorneys were present during
preliminary investigations.159
The backlash to authoritarian rule was the widespread desire to
state power. One of these expressions was the popular acceptance
of the constitutional guarantee that all persons suspected or
accused of a crime have a right to legal counsel.160 Yet in 1994 the
police refused to grant two defendants access to council during
their preliminary interrogations based on an exception contained
within the Code of Criminal Procedure.161 Article 58(3)(2) of the
Code stipulated that where the access to counsel jeopardizes an
impartial
investigation,
the
investigator
can
observe
correspondence between the accused and their attorney for fifteen
days.162 The Vilnius Second District Court halted its proceedings,
KGB each had investigators who were responsible for objectively considering the
evidence against an accused and deciding whether to indict).
158 See Eugene Huskey, The Politics of the Soviet Criminal Process: Expanding the
Right to Counsel in Pre-Trial Proceedings, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 93, 95-102 (1986)
(describing the struggle between conservatives and reformists who campaigned
for counsel to be involved in pre-trial processes).
159 Id. at 105.
160 See LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS KONSTITUCIJA [Constitution] art. 31 (1992) (Lith.)
(“From the moment of arrest or first interrogation, persons suspected or accused
of a crime shall be guaranteed the right to defence [sic] and legal counsel.”)
161 On the confidentiality of legal counsel (Criminal Procedure Case), Const.
Ct. Lith, Nov. 18, 1994, available at http://lrkt.lt/dokumentai/1994/n4a1118a.htm.
Both defendants were charged with extortion of public property. Id.
162 Id. § III, para.7.
The legislator, conforming to the necessity of the control of evidence
material, in item 3, part 2, Article 58 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
established such a rule by the Law of 10 December 1991: ‘In cases when
there are grounds for maintaining that such meetings will have negative
influence on a thorough and impartial investigation of the circumstances
of the case, an interrogator or investigator shall be allowed to participate
in the conversations between a counsel and a defendant and control the
correspondence with a person suspected or accused of a crime within the
first 15 days of detention or arrest; further participation in the
conversations of a counsel and a defendant and control of
correspondence shall be possible only on the consent of a procurator or a
judge.’
Id. (quoting LITH. CRIM. CODE. art. 58(3)(2) (1991)).
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and petitioned the Constitutional Court to ascertain the
constitutionality of Article 58.163 Thus, in the Criminal Procedure
Case, the Constitutional Court was confronted with the tricky task
of balancing public pressure against government action.
As was the case with the death penalty, the Constitutional
Court in this case, in balancing the rights of the defendant against
the power of the state, looked to international law for guidance
when it was not under an obligation to do so. The opinion first
compared the norms of the Code of Criminal Procedure to relevant
provisions of international law. The Constitutional Court took
note of a United Nations General Assembly resolution declaring
that all detained individuals be provided access to legal counsel
immediately upon arrest.164 Specifically, the Court took note of the
principles which establish exceptions for exceptional circumstances
relating to investigations.165 Pursuant to the General Assembly’s
resolution, a detained person’s access to counsel may be lawfully
delayed “when it is considered indispensable by a judicial or other
authority in order to maintain security and good order.”166
The Constitutional Court, moreover, looked to the ECHR
provisions dealing with the right to legal counsel.167 Specifically,
Id. § I, para. 3.
Id. § III, para. 11. See also Body of Principles for the Protection of All
Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 173, at 297
U.N. GAOR, 43rd Sess., Supp No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/173 (1988) [hereinafter
Body of Principles].
165 Criminal Procedure Case, § III, para. 24.
166 Body of Principles, supra note 164, at 299. Specifically the Constitutional
Court took notice of Principles 15, 16 and 18. Principle 15 provides in full that
“Notwithstanding the exceptions . . . communication of the detained or
imprisoned person with the outside world, and in particular his family or counsel,
shall not be denied for more than a matter of days.” Id. (internal citations
omitted). The two exceptions to providing accused individuals with immediate
access to legal counsel are outlined in Principles 16 and 18. Principle 16(4) states
that: “Any notification referred to in the present principle shall be made or
permitted to be made without delay. The competent authority may however
delay a notification for a reasonable period where exceptional needs of the
investigation so require.” Id. Principle 18(3) similarly provides:
163
164

The right of a detained or imprisoned person to be visited by and to
consult and communicate, without delay or censorship and in full
confidentiality, with his legal counsel may not be suspended or restricted
save in exceptional circumstances, to be specified by law or lawful
regulations, when it is considered indispensable by a judicial or other
authority in order to maintain security and good order.
Id. See also Criminal Procedure Case, § III, para.24 (discussing G.A. Res. 43/173).
167 Criminal Procedure Case, § III, para.12.
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the Court looked to Article 6(3) of the ECHR which outlines the
right of the accused to obtain access to counsel, to prepare a
defense, and to promptly be informed of the “nature and cause of
the accusation against him.”168 However, Article 6 of the ECHR
does not contain a special circumstances exception for access to
counsel. Interestingly, in order to avoid a conflict between the
Criminal Code and the ECHR, the Constitutional Court analogized
Article 6 of the ECHR to Articles 17 and 52 of the Lithuanian
Criminal Code.169 Indeed, the Lithuanian Criminal Code does
mandate that defendants have access to counsel, are entitled to
prepare a defense and have other rights similar to those contained
in Article 6 of the ECHR.170 In so doing, the Court concluded that
“[t]he norms of the Code of Criminal Procedure are actually in
conformity according to their contents with the international
instruments regulating the right to defence.”171
To bolster this conclusion—that the ECHR is in conformity
with the Lithuanian Criminal Code—the Court took note of the
case of Campbell v. United Kingdom.172 The Constitutional Court
noted that the ECtHR stated that the guarantee of access to legal
counsel may be given “wider interpretation” in light of the
ECHR.173 As such, a state may legitimately restrict access to
counsel when there is a risk that the defense may abuse its status,
thereby hindering the proceedings.
Lastly, the Constitutional Court looked to the laws in other
European jurisdictions. The Court observed that Swedish law
prescribes that “confidential meetings are possible only on the
permission of an investigator, procurator or judge.”174 The Court
also noted an exception to attorney-client confidentiality found in
Article 45 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. Explaining
the provision, the Court wrote, “when there are circumstances due
to which the conversation between a lawyer and a defendant may
168 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.
6(3)(a), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
169 Criminal Procedure Case, § III, para. 13.
170 Id. (citing LITH. CRIM. CODE. arts. 17 & 52 (1991)).
171 Id.
172 Campbell v. United Kingdom, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992) (finding the
screening of correspondence between Campbell and his attorney by U.K. prison
officials to be a violation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights.)
173 Criminal Procedure Case, § III, para. 25.
174 Id. § III, para. 23.
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have negative influence on the collection of evidence, the order
may be given to observe the meetings of a lawyer with his
defendant within the first 14 days of arrest.”175 Similar exceptions
to attorney-client confidentiality and access were found in the
criminal laws of Italy, Germany, Sweden, Belgium, were cited by
the Constitutional Court in dicta.176
All of the foregoing precedent allowed the Constitutional Court
to conclude that the “norm of the Code of Criminal Procedure
[restricting the right to legal counsel] not only is in conformity with
the Constitution but also is in accord with the underlying
provisions of the Law on Criminal Procedure and is based on legal
practice of foreign states and the logic of the reality [sic] our
country’s judicial life.”177 However, at the time the opinion was
handed down in 1994, Lithuania was not a party to the ECHR.
Accordingly, Article 138 of the Lithuanian Constitution mandating
that international law be directly incorporated into domestic law
did not apply and was not invoked by the Constitutional Court.178
Indeed, at the time did the EU did not issue regular reports which
included the protection of individual rights in the criminal justice
system, nor had the EU “pre-accession strategy” been launched at
the 1994 Essen European Council.179
The international political pressure present in the death penalty
case was thus absent in this instance. Moreover, the means of
obtaining constitutional review differed; the appeal was from a
lower court, not members of the Seimas. Still, the Constitutional
Court used non-binding international law as external legitimacy in
upholding the exception to the attorney-client relationship. The
international political context and means of review are insufficient
as explanations for the Court’s jurisprudence. These two cases,
read in combination, imply that judicial legitimacy and
independence was asserted by the use of international legal
references independent of the international political context and
means of review.
Id.
Id.
177 Id. § III, para. 2.
178 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
179 See generally Marc Maresceau, Pre-Accession, in THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION 9 (Marise Cremona, ed. 2003) (discussing EU enlargement and
pre-accession strategies including EU initiatives to align member countries
politically, economically, and legally in an effort to promote new-member
assimilation to the EU).
175
176
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4.2. Estonia
4.2.1.

Institutional and Contextual Factors

Like their Lithuanian counterparts, the creation of a law-based
state was atop the reform priorities of the Estonian Popular Front,
which included that goal in their 1988 charter.180 Yet the desire to
create a Rechtsstaat did not manifest into the creation of a special
Constitutional Court, as it did in Lithuania. All Central and
Eastern European countries to emerge from communism adopted a
legal system in the Austrian tradition with a constitutional court,
with one notable exception: Estonia.181
The Estonian legal system does not, however, operate
exclusively in the American tradition. The Estonian National
Court (Riigikohus) was successful in obtaining constitutional review
jurisdiction in a similar vein to the American model of
jurisprudence. The amount of constitutional disputes was seen, at
the time, as insufficient to require a special tribunal to adjudicate
This is stipulated in Article 149 of the Estonian
them.182
Constitution which states: “The Supreme Court is the highest court
in the state and shall review court judgments.”183 Article 149 of the
Estonian Constitution further grants the Supreme Court
A special tribunal—the
constitutional review authority.184
Constitutional Review Chamber (“CRC”)—was established within
the National Court to be responsible for adjudicating constitutional
Notwithstanding a specialized body within the
disputes.185
National Court dedicated to hearing constitutional issues, the
nature of the Estonian court system can best be characterized as
“diffuse;” in contrast to the “centralized” model adopted by
Lithuania in the Austrian-Kelsen tradition.
Article 149 of the Constitution provides that cases are to
proceed by “cassation proceedings,” meaning an intermediate

Loeber, supra note 117, at 80.
Schwartz, Eastern European Courts, supra note 3, at 198 (stating that Estonia
was the only of the emerging Central and Eastern European countries where the
new power of constitutional judicial review was successful).
182 SCHWARTZ, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-COMMUNIST
EUROPE, supra note 3, at 253 note 7.
183 EESTI VABARIIGI PÕHISEADUS [Constitution] art. 149 (1992) (Est.).
184 Id. art. 149.
185 Id.
180
181
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court has the right to review the decision of lower courts.186 The
Estonian Constitution further prohibits lower courts from applying
acts which contradict the Constitution. Article 152 provides: “In a
court proceeding, the court shall not apply any law or other
legislation that is in conflict with the Constitution. The Supreme
Court shall declare invalid any law or other legislation that is in
conflict with the provisions and spirit of the Constitution.”187
Furthermore, the selection of judges for the CRC does not differ in
the selection of judges from the National Court.188 This, according
to the CoE, may lead to increased influence of other bodies of
government on the CRC, because it is not isolated, as would be the
case with a Kelsen-style Constitutional Court.189 No further
provisions are enumerated specifying that lower courts are
required, as a matter of procedure, to refer constitutional issues to
the CRC, as are enumerated in the Lithuanian Constitution.190 If
the Estonian Constitution contained such a requirement, the legal
system could be considered to operate analogously to the diffuse
Austrian/Kelsen model. However, Article 149, read in conjunction
with Article 152, gives lower courts authority to review
constitutional matters, just like lower courts in the American
system. For example, in 2005 the Tallinn Circuit Court—an
appellate court—reversed a lower court judgment on the grounds
that two provisions of the law in question were unconstitutional.191
Id.
Id. art. 152.
188 Sergio Bartole, European Commission for Democracy through Law, The Reform
of Constitutional Justice in Estonia, (EC) No. CDL (97)053 (1997).
189 Id. at 7 (stating that the establishment of a constitutional court in Estonia is
necessary for protecting liberties); Sergio Bartole & Helmut Steinberger, European
Commission for Democracy through Law, Opinion on the Reform of Constitutional Justice
in Estonia (EC) No. CDL (98)059 (1998).
190 The appellate procedure was confirmed by the CRC in Review of the
Petition of the Valga County Court (Valga City Rules), (Valga County Ct. June 9,
1997, No. 3–4–1–3–97, available at http://www.nc.ee/?id=465&print=1. In Valga
City Rules, the Valga administrative judge refused to apply a section of the city
rules requiring minors under 16 to be accompanied by an adult between 11:00pm
and 6:00am. Id. pmbl., paras. 1–2. The CRC noted that the “Valga administrative
judge . . . did not apply clause 3.19 of Part I of the Valga City Rules . . . to the
extent that it prescribed for a restriction of the freedom of movement of persons
under 16 years of age . . . .” Id. pmbl., para. 1. The court did this on its own,
without referring this constitutional matter to another court.
191 See Petition of Tallinn Circuit Court to Declare Sentences 3 and 5 of §
131(2) of Law of Property Act Implementation Act Invalid (Property
Implementation Act II), No. 3–4–1–16–05, § 1, para. 5 (Riigikohus [Supreme Court]
Dec. 15, 2005) (invalidating the judgment of the County Court, declining to apply
186
187
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Additionally the Tallinn Administrative Court—a court of first
instance—rendered Section 25(3) of the Property Law Enforcement
Act unconstitutional in a case in 1994.192
Indeed, the Estonian court system has been criticized for its
lack of a Constitutional Court. The CoE has championed the role
of the Austrian system of judicial review in Europe.193 Others have
recommended that Estonia reconfigure its judicial institutions and
procedures to incorporate a Constitutional Court.194 This is
because a Constitutional Court, with its special status and
increased insularity, is perceived as a better guarantor of
individual liberties and observer of government power.
Like the American court system, the Estonian Constitution
provides that constitutional review can be done ex post through the
regular procedure of appealing a lower court decision upwards to
the National Court.195 That is, any party whose case is in either a
court of first instance or in an appellate proceeding can challenge
the constitutionality of any Act. The lower courts are also given
the authority to rule on the constitutionality of any Act during the

and declaring unconstitutional the third and fifth sentences of § 131(2) of LPAIA,
giving a co-owner of property a right of pre-emption).
192 Review of the constitutionality of § 25(3) of the Law of Property Act
Implementation Act to the extent that it repeals of § 30(2) of the Farm Act of the
Estonian SSR (Property Implementation Act I), No. III–4/A–5/94 (Riigikohus
[Supreme Court] Sept. 30, 1994). The CRC noted that:
On 27 May 1994 the Tallinn Administrative Court decided to satisfy the
request of Elmar Rikmann and not to apply § 25(3) of the Law of
Property Act Implementation Act to the extent that it repealed § 30(2) of
the Farm Act, as the provision was in conflict with § 10 of the
Constitution. The Tallinn Administrative Court held that § 10 of the
Constitution establishes the principles of a state based on democracy,
social justice and the rule of law as a basis for the legal system of Estonia.
Observance of the principles of the rule of law requires the guaranteeing
and safeguarding of the people’s confidence in the law and in the
lawfulness of state authorities.
Id. para. 3. In this case, a statute stated that farms set up on the basis of that
statute would be exempt from taxes for five years. A later statute then imposed
taxes on those farms within the five years. The Court ruled that the latter statute
was unconstitutional.
193 See Bartole, supra note 188 (stating a preference for the Austrian System of
judicial review).
194 Id. at 6.
195 EESTI VABARIIGI PÕHISEADUS [Constitution] art. 24 (1992) (Est.).
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proceeding.196 As such, the Estonian legal system is characteristic
of a diffuse system of judicial review.197
However, Estonia does provide for abstract review in two
particular circumstances, thus distinguishing it from the American
system. The National Court may review the constitutionality of a
proposed law ex ante on request of the President where he or she
has used a veto and the Riigikogu had subsequently passed the
law without amendment.198 The National Court can also abstractly
review a law ex post under authority granted by Articles 142 and
152 of the Constitution.199 Under those circumstances, the Legal
Chancellor has authority to challenge the constitutionality of a law
promulgated by a state government or executive authority in the
National Court.200 It is to be noted, however, that within a few
years of independence, the lower courts have been more assertive
in exercising their authority to declare acts unconstitutional.
Appeals from lower courts have outnumbered the references from
the Legal Chancellor and President since 1997.201
Like the Lithuanian Constitution, the Estonian Constitution
adopted a monist approach to applying international law in
domestic courts. However, Estonia recognizes the supremacy of
international law over domestic laws.202 The Estonian Constitution
expressly provides that “[i]f laws or other legislation of Estonia are
in conflict with international treaties ratified by the Riigikogu, the
provisions of the international treaty shall apply.”203 This was
expressly recognized by the Constitutional Review Chamber which
ruled that domestic laws which conflict with the obligations of
international treaties are to be set aside by the courts.204 This is, of
course, part of the diffuse nature of the Estonian legal system in

196 Id. art. 152. See also Valga City Rules, pmbl., paras. 1-2; Property
Implementation Act II, § 1, para. 5; Property Implementation Act, para. 3 (finding an
act to be unconstitutional in all of these cases).
197 SUKSI, supra note 118, at 29.
198 EESTI VABARIIGI PÕHISEADUS [Constitution] art. 107 (1992) (Est.).
199 Id. arts. 142, 152.
200 Id. arts. 142, 152.
201 Maveety & Grosskopf, supra note 8, at 472 n. 9.
202 Vereshchetin, supra note 104, at 34.
203 EESTI VABARIIGI PÕHISEADUS [Constitution] art. 123 (1992) (Est.).
204 Review of the petition of the Tallinn Administrative Court of 12 May 1997
to declare invalid § 41 of the Police Service Regulations (Police Service
Regulations), No. 3–4–1–1–97, § II para. 3 (Riigikohus [Supreme Court] June 11,
1997).
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that lower courts are given authority to declare domestic
legislation unconstitutional. This provision, like that of Lithuania,
is also conducive of the courts being able to assert legitimacy and
independence.
4.2.2.

Case Law

4.2.2.1.

The Police Act Case

Under communism, the police functioned as a milita whose
mission it was to protect the existing communist regime with little
regard for the rule of law. Under the direction of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs, the police compiled secret files and conducted
interrogations on the mere suspicion that an individual was
engaging in subversive activities, or simply for blatant
harassment.205 This normative experience under communism was
difficult to reform in light of the clandestine, communist mindset
that police duties were extraordinary and that public
accountability would only reduce effectiveness.206
Police reform began in Estonia with the Police Act of 1990,207
which was subsequently revised by the Riigikogu in April 1993.208
Contained in its provisions is the authorization of the police to
“implement special surveillance measures in performance of their
duties, only upon written consent of a National Court justice.”209
The Legal Chancellor appealed to the Riigikogu to revoke the
provision of special surveillance, which the Riigikogu refused to
do. The Legal Chancellor then petitioned the CRC to invalidate the

Sanja Kutnjak Ivković & Maria R. Haberfeld, Transformation from Militia to
Police in Croatia and Poland: A Comparative Prespective, 23 POLICING: INT’L J. OF
POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 194, 195–96 (2000).
206 Bill Hebenton & Jon Spencer, Assessing International Assistance in Law
Enforcement: Themes, Findings and Recommendations from a Case-Study of the Republic
of Estonia, EUR. INST. CRIME PREVENTION & CONTROL, Pub. Series No. 37, at 7 (2001).
207 Police Act, 10 Riigi Teataja [State Gazette] 113 (1990) (outlining the role,
function, and duties of the police force, with specific details regarding acceptable
police behavior).
208 Police of the Republic of Estonia Amendment Act, 20 Riigi Teataja [State
Gazette] 355 (1993).
209 Review of the Petition of the Chancellor of Justice, submitted under §
142(2) of the Constitution, for the declaration of invalidity of subindent 4 of Part II
of the Republic of Estonia Police Act Amendment Act under § Article 152(2) of the
Constitution (Police Act Case), No. III-4/A-1/94, § 1, para. 1. (Riigikohus
[Supreme Court] Dec. 15, 2005).
205
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provision on the grounds that it was unconstitutional.210 As
previously discussed, judicial independence is viewed in light of
its insularity from influence and pressure from other branches of
government regarding a particular policy consequence. In light of
the communist police legacy and parliament members’ support of
special surveillance provisions, the judicial curtailment of police
powers is a policy area which can demonstrate how judicial
independence can be established.
The Legal Chancellor asserted that the term “special operative
surveillance measures” was undefined211 in violation of Section 11
of the Constitution.212 Specifically, it was argued that the Act
“leaves it up to discretion of the security police officers and a
justice of the Supreme Court to decide: (1) what is to be deemed a
special operative surveillance measure; (2) what are the cases and
procedure for application of those special measures which have not
been regulated by the law.”213 The CRC began its analysis by
analogizing “recognized principles” of international law to Section
3 of the Estonian Constitution, which establishes that individual
rights and liberities can only be restricted in accordance with the
law.214 The CRC also took notice of Article 8 of the ECHR
regarding privacy in the home, family, and communications.215
Accordingly, the CRC held that Part II(4) of the Police Act was
incompatible with the Constitution because the scope of police

Id. § 1, para 5.
Id. § 1, paras. 2–4.
212
EESTI VABARIIGI PÕHISEADUS[CONSTITUTION] art. 11 (1992) (Est.) (“Rights
and freedoms may be restricted only in accordance with the Constitution. Such
restrictions must be necessary in a democratic society and shall not distort the
nature of the rights and freedoms restricted.”).
213 Police Act Case, § 1 at para. 3.
214 Id. § 4, para. 4.
215 Id. § 4, para. 6. See also European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. Article
8 provides in full:
210
211

(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise
of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary
in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety
or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others.
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discretion to institute special surveillance measures was wider
than the Constitution permitted.216
As was the case with its Lithuanian counterpart, the Estonian
Supreme Court interpreted Estonian Constitutional provisions in
light of international law when it was not under an obligation to do
so. Estonia became a signatory of the ECHR in 1996.217 Just as the
Lithuanian Constitutional Court, Estonia became a signatory while
its courts were asserting legitimacy and independence against the
power of the executive and legislative branches of government.218
Thus, the method of incorporation of international treaties into
domestic law was inapplicable in this instance for lack of a ratified
treaty.
Moreover, international political influence had not
developed to a significant point by the time the decision was
rendered in 1994. Yet the Court looked to international law as an
external source of legitimacy in an almost identical way to that
which the Lithuanian Constitutional Court did in 1994 and 1998,
notwithstanding the systemic differences among their judiciaries.
4.2.2.2.

The Language Act

Perhaps in no other context is a counter-majoritarian issue
more clear than with the contentious minority issues in Estonia.
After World War II, the Soviets began a policy of forced
Russification within the Baltic countries to counteract the massive
population losses of the war.
Soviet policy encouraged the relocation of Russians to the
Soviet republics. These migrants brought with them both their
language and culture.219 Demobilized Russian soldiers were
provided with
employment
throughout the Baltics.220
Zhdanovschina—the Soviet policy of asserting strict cultural control
through terror—was implemented throughout the Baltic States.221

Police Act Case, para. 31.
See EUR. PARL. ASS., Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Estonia
4th Sess., Doc. No. 7715 (1996) (discussing Estonia’s ratification of international
human rights conventions and membership in the Council of Europe).
218 See supra Sections 4.1.2.1., 4.1.2.2.
219 See generally Claire Messina, From Migrants to Refugees: Russian, Soviet and
Post-Soviet Migration, 6 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 620, 622–24 (1994) (discussing Soviet
policies designed to encourage Russian migration to the Republics, and how this
migration drastically changed the ethnic composition of the Soviet republics).
220 LIEVEN, supra note 119, at 183.
221 Id. at 92.
216
217
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As a result of these factors, the large Russophone minority in
Estonia became associated with the communist occupation.
Estonia’s desire to be “reborn” as a nation-state manifested itself in
the resurrection of pre-communist culture and language and a
rejection of associations with the communist era.222 Constitutional
issues relating to language or cultural requirements are thus a
quintessential countermajoritarian policy response to the strong
preferences of politicians and the population at large to reassert an
Estonian identity in society after a long period in which it was
artificially subdued.
The Estonianization policy institutionalized language as a
component of citizenship. Russian and Estonian come from the
Slavic and Finno-Ugric linguistic families, respectively. The
Estonian Constitution provides formal guarantees of minority
rights but has generally been narrowly interpreted due to public
opinion and the nationalist Pro-Patria Party’s presence in various
coalition governments.223 The Language Act and the Local
Elections Act were policy consequences of this ethno-linguistic
dynamic. Section 3(3) of the Local Elections Act mandated that
those seeking to hold public office demonstrate an unspecified
level of proficiency in the Estonian language.
In 1997, the National Electoral Committee of Estonia refused to
officially register Russophone politician Juri Šutenko, thereby
preventing him from assuming his seat on the Maardu City
Council, on the grounds that he was not proficient in Estonian.224

See Maveety & Grosskopf, supra note 8, at 470 (describing the effort within
Estonia in the wake of its independence to re-establish its political elite, language,
and culture).
223 See, e.g., EESTI VABARIIGI PÕHISEADUS [Constitution] art. 1 (1992) (Est.)
(“Everyone is equal before the law. No one shall be discriminated against on the
basis of nationality, race, colour, sex, language, origin, religion, political or other
opinion, property or social status, or on other grounds.”); Id. art. 50 (“[N]ational
minorities have the right, in the interests of national culture, to establish selfgoverning agencies under conditions and pursuant to procedure provided by the
National Minorities Cultural Autonomy Act.”); Id. art. 51 (“Everyone has the right
to address state agencies, local governments, and their officials in Estonian and to
receive responses in Estonian. In localities where at least one-half of the
permanent residents belong to a national minority, everyone has the right to also
receive responses from state agencies, local governments, and their officials in the
language of the national minority.”).
224 Review of the petition of the Harju County Court to declare § 3(3) and §
26(7)1) of the Local Government Council Election Act, § 5(1) of the Language Act,
and the Government of the Republic Regulation no. 188 entitled “Enactment of
the description of the level of proficiency in Estonian necessary to work in the
222
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The petition of the National Electoral Committee was initially
dismissed by the Harju County Court on the grounds that the
provisions of the Language Act and Local Government Council
Election Act requiring Estonian language proficiency were
incompatible with the Estonian Constitution.225 The case was
appealed to the Supreme Court.
The CRC’s reasoning was somewhat different from that in the
Police Act Case. Although Estonia was a party to several
international treaties at the time of the ruling that stipulated the
protection of minority rights, the CRC did not refer to them
explicitly. Rather, the Court set out to reconcile internal political
and legal considerations while under international political
pressure regarding the rights of the Russian minority.226 It did so
by implicitly referencing ECHR and ECJ jurisprudence as an
external source of legitimacy in its elaboration of a requirement of
necessary proportionality with regard to language laws.
The Court stressed that the extent of the restriction on liberty
must be necessary and “not distort the nature of the rights and
freedoms restricted.”227 The decision noted that “the Estonian
language is an essential component of the Estonian nation and
culture, without which the preservation of the Estonian nation and
culture is not possible.”228 Yet the CRC held that election laws are
required to be passed by the legislature and thus cannot be
Riigikogu and local government councils” partly invalid (Language Act Case),
No. 3-4-1-7-98 (Riigikohus [Supreme Court] Nov. 4, 1998).
225 Id. para 4.
226 The EU noted that the Language Act may impede the free movement of
workers and services. See Regular Report from the Commission on Estonia’s Progress
Towards Accession, at 15, COM (1999) (stating that the Language Act may have a
detrimental effect on Community workers and companies, while also potentially
constituting restriction in the entry and temporary residence in the territory of
Community nationals). The EU and OSCE also noted the problems of Estonian
Language Laws in multiple other documents dating from 1993. The first High
Commissioner on Minorities visited Estonia in 1993 and the OSCE subsequently
established a mission in Estonia.
See generally ORG. FOR SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE, HIGH COMMISSIONER ON NATIONAL MINORITIES, REPORT ON
THE LINGUISTIC RIGHTS OF PERSONS BELONGING TO NATIONAL MINORITIES IN THE
OSCE AREA (1999) (discussing the linguistic rights of minority groups in many
nations); ORG. FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, HIGH COMMISSIONER ON
NATIONAL MINORITIES, THE OSLO RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE LINGUISTIC
RIGHTS OF NATIONAL MINORITIES & EXPLANATORY NOTE (1998) (listing Estonia as a
nation in which the dispute between ethnic minorities and central authorities may
escalate).
227 Language Act Case, § IV.
228 Id. § III, para. 1.
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delegated to the executive.229 Since both Section 3(3) of the Local
Elections Act and Section 5(1) of the Language Act empowered the
executive to set a procedure for ascertaining the level of language
proficiency without the legislature speaking on the issue, the laws
were thus unconstitutional grants of legislative power.230
The result of this decision was to force the Riigikogu to
reconsider the enactment while under international pressure.
Indeed, the legislative effort to reform the Local Elections Act and
Language Act centered on making Estonian policy compatable
with international human rights standards. This was expressed by
numerous members of the Riigikogu during committee and floor
debates who referenced the opinions of European delegates in
Estonia.231 The Local Elections Act and Language Act were
subsequently amended and codified with precise criteria for
language proficiency. The 1999 Act was viewed as incompatible
with both international standards and the Constitution.232 The
CRC recast the Local Elections Act and Language Act in terms
which did not preclude domestic political objectives from being
asserted in an environment which considered the international
legal obligations and political ramifications.
5.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

International law has had a profound effect on the judicial
transition in the CEE countries. Courts throughout the transition
process utilized international law both formally and informally as
a source of external legitimacy when ruling on those issues which
could potentially evoke the greatest response from the public and
government. This assertion holds true for countries with judicial
systems crafted in both the American and Austrian traditions. The
similarities in the jurisprudence of the Lithuanian Constitutional
Court and the Estonian National Court are observed
notwithstanding differing international political contexts; the
influence of the EU and CoE was more prevalent during the latter
cases than the former. These similarities exist despite differing
methods of challenging the constitutionality of a government act.
Id. § II, para. 1.
Id. § IV, para. 1.
231 Maveety & Grosskopf, supra note 8, at 482–85.
232 See id. at 482 (discussing how the CRC’s recommendations acted as a
catalyst to debate within Estonia over the constitutionality of these legislative
acts).
229
230
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Thus, the use of international law as an external source of
legitimacy can be seen as a greater determinant of judicial
independence and legitimacy than the formal structure or
procedures of the legal system.
The broader implication is that the role of formal guarantees of
judicial independence and the design of legal system in the
establishment of judicial independence and legitimacy has been
somewhat overemphasized in legal thinking and policy
approaches. Furthermore, the method of applying international
law in domestic courts also seems to be somewhat overemphasized
because of the extensive use of non-binding international norms in
the courts’ jurisprudence. The significance of international law as
an external source of judicial independence and legitimacy, as
demonstrated by the legal reasoning of various courts, establishes
that future studies on judicial, political, and economic transitions
should look to the operation of the court system and judicial
reasoning therein.
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